




The Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, yet Congress
grants expansive lawmaking authority to federal agencies. As positive political
theorists have long explored, Congress intends for federal agencies to faithfully
exercise their delegated authority, but ensuring fidelity to congressional wishes is
difficult due to asymmetries in information, expertise, and preferences that com-
plicate congressional control and oversight. Indeed, this principal-agent problem
has a democratic and constitutional dimension, as the legitimacy of administra-
tive governance may well depend on whether the unelected bureaucracy is a
faithful agent of Congress. Despite the predominance of lawmaking by regulation
and the decades-long application of principal-agent heory to the regulatory
state, we know very little about how federal agencies interpret statutes.
This Article looks inside the black box of agency statutory interpretation in
the rulemaking context. The Article reports the findings of a 195-question survey
of agency rule drafters at seven executive departments (Agriculture, Commerce,
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Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, and Transportation) and two independent agencies (the Federal
Communications Commission a d the Federal Reserve). Of the 411 officials sent
the survey, 128 responded, and their answers shed considerable light on the tools
and approaches they use to interpret statutes and draft regulations. The findings
uncovered challenge some theories on agency interpretation while reinforcing
others. As Congress, courts, and scholars gain more insight into how federal
agencies use the canons, legislative history, and judicial deference doctrines in
agency statutory interpretation, the relationship between Congress and federal
agencies should improve, as should the judicial branch's ability to monitor and
faithfully constrain lawmaking by regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the rise and rise of the modern administrative state, the focus and
function of lawmaking have shifted from judge-made common law, to congres-
sionally enacted statutes, and now to agency-promulgated regulations. As of
2013, the Code of Federal Regulations exceeded 175,000 pages and included
1. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV, 1231 (1994).
2. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 356-57
(2012). To be sure, the administrative state is not purely a creature of the New Deal. See
generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) (tracing the history of the
regulatory state from the Founding to the Gilded Age). But its rise as a predominant lawmak-
ing branch is of more recent vintage. See Stack, supra, at 356-57.
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tens of thousands of rules. In 2013 alone, federal agencies filled about 80,000
pages of the Federal Register with adopted rules, proposed rules, and notices.4
By contrast, the 133rd Congress (2013-2014) enacted just 144 public laws for a
total of 1750 pages in the Statutes at Large.) Such broad delegation of lawmak-
ing authority by Congress to federal agencies creates a principal-agent problem:
"[T]he legislature would like the agency to carry out its wishes faithfully, but
ensuring the fidelity of the agency may be costly, if not impossible."6
Political scientists have spent decades exploring the difficulties involved in
Congress's control and oversight of its bureaucratic agents. Those difficulties
can be attributed to, among other things, asymmetries in information, expertise,
and preferences between Congress (the principal) and federal agencies (the
agents).8 Positive political theorists have also emphasized the dueling princi-
3. See CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND COM-
MANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 20 & fig.13, 21 &
fig.14 (2014) (reporting the total pages in 2013 as 175,496).
4. See Exec. Order No. 13,655, 78 Fed. Reg. 80,451, 80,462 (Dec. 31, 2013) (dis-
playing the last page from 2013); see also CREWS, supra note 3, at 61 (noting that 1151 of
the 80,462 pages were blank). See generally MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 17 tbl.6 (2013) (providing year-by-year
statistics on the content of the Federal Register by pages and actual numbers of proposed
and final rules).
5. Compare Pub. L. No. 113-1, 127 Stat. 3 (2013), with Pub. L. No. 113-144, 128
Stat. 1751, 1752 (2014) (reflecting the number of pages taken up with public laws).
6. Nuno Garoupa & Jud Mathews, Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference:
Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5-6
(2014); see also JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DIScRETION?: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIc AUTONOMY 26 (2002) ("The principal-agent
framework from economics has played an extremely prominent and powerful role in th[e]
institutional approach to relations between politicians and bureaucrats."); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749,1767-76
(2007) (reviewing the positive political theory account of administrative procedures).
7. Congressional oversight and control has been the central focus in the political sci-
ence literature with foundational contributions by Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Bar-
ry Weingast (collectively known as "McNollgast"), See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger
G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Con-
trol, 3 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 243, 254 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 165, 166 (1984); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure
and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 468-81 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins, Noll & Weingast,
Structure and Process].
8. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCL
739, 765-72 (1984) (applying principal-agent theory to the administrative state and detailing
asymmetries and other complications); see also Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of
Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203 (2005) (reviewing political science liter-
ature on the evolution of the principal-agency model for the administrative state); Matthew
C. Stephenson, Legislutive Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the
Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2006) ("The basic
principal-agent dilemma, of which legislative delegation is a subspecies, involves a tradeoff
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pals problem: many federal agencies report to at least two principals-
Congress and the President.9 Other scholars have explored the justifications for
congressional delegation of interpretive authority-for example, agency exper-
tise, legislative drafting costs, and political insulation-and how these different
justifications may affect what agency interpretive fidelity means.10 Moreover,
the principal-agent model has been criticized as overly simplistic as other ac-
tors-for example, the executive, interest groups, and the public-play an im-
portant role in the relationship.1' For example, in critiquing one such model
Adrian Vermeule has remarked that "the crucial simplifications seem not only
artificial, but arbitrary-as though a political scientist decided to study only the
behavior of left-handed senators, deferring right-handed ones to future re-
search."12 Indeed, the agency can even become the principal in manipulating
the elected branches.t 3
These criticisms notwithstanding, this principal-agent problem may well
implicate the democratic and constitutional legitimacy of administrative gov-
ernance. After all, the Constitution vests "[all legislative Powers herein grant-
ed . .. in a Congress of the United States" 14-not in either the executive or ju-
dicial branch, much less in an unelected bureaucracy. So the legitimacy of
delegating expansive lawmaking authority to unelected regulators may well de-
pend on whether those regulators are faithful agents of Congress (though, as
noted above, assessing agency interpretive fidelity may vary based on the justi-
between the principal's desire to exploit the agent's informational advantages and the princi-
pal's concern that the agent will pursue divergent goals,"),
9. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 8, at 211-12; Moe, supra note 8, at 768-69. The legal
literature has also grappled with this principal-agent dilemma in the administrative state-
focusing primarily on Congress's imposition of agency procedures via statute and its enlist-
ment of the judicial branch to monitor and constrain agency behavior. See, e.g., Bressman,
supra note 6, at 1749, 1751-55 (combining positive political theory with legal scholarship on
administrative law to understand courts' role in "mediating the strategic needs of both politi-
cal branches for control of agency action" (italics omitted)); Garoupa & Mathews, supra
note 6, at 5-9 (utilizing principal-agent theory to model "the interaction between three insti-
tutions"-"the legislature, an agency, and a reviewing court"-comparatively across various
national governments worldwide); see also McNollgast & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Administra-
tive Law Agonistes, 108 COLUM. L. R.v. SIDEBAR 15 (2008), http://columbialawreview.org
/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/15 MeNollgast.pdf (responding to Bressman, supra note 6).
10. For a literature review of the application of positive political theory to agency stat-
utory interpretation, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLic LAw 285 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne
Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010).
11. For an overview of the various models, see Brigham Daniels, Agency as Principal,
48 GA. L. Rriv. 335, 345-71, 358 fig.1, 360 fig.2, 365 fig.3, 366 fig.4, 367 fig.5, 368 fig.6,
369 fig.7, 370 fig.8 (2014).
12. Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery, 119 HARv. L. REv. F. 105, 105-06
(2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=891831.
13. See Daniels, supra note II, at 383-411.
14. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 1.
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fication for delegation, and the principal-agent model may be too simplistic to
capture fully the relationship between Congress and the regulatory state).15
Despite the predominance of lawmaking by regulation and the decades-
long application of principal-agent theory to the administrative state, agency
statutory interpretation remains, to a large extent, a black box. Terry Moe has
explained how these information asymmetries create a "built-in control prob-
lem" because the bureaucratic
agent has expertise and other information-about his own diligence and apti-
tude, for example, or his actual behavior on the job-that are largely unavaila-
ble to the principal, and this asymmetry makes it difficult for the principal to
ensure that his own interests are being faithfully pursued by the agent.t6
This control problem affects not only how Congress delegates its lawmaking
authority to and then oversees federal agencies but also how courts patrol such
delegations. We do not know if federal agencies are familiar with, much less
adhere to, the rules, customs, and practices that Congress and courts would ex-
pect an agent of Congress to follow. Nor do we know how federal agencies dis-
tinguish circumstances in which Congress has delegated by ambiguity a meas-
ure of broader authority for agencies to pursue policies in the public interest
from those in which it has delegated only narrower authority to enforce the law
"as written"-to the extent there is even a meaningful difference between these
two functions. Jerry Mashaw has underscored the critical need for empirical
work on these matters: "Inquiry into the empirical realities of agency interpre-
tive practice can provide a crucial window on these issues and an essential step
in the assessment of the legitimacy of administrative governance."
To better understand the empirical realties of statutory interpretation inside
the administrative state, this Article reports the findings of a 195-question sur-
vey of agency rule drafters that covers a variety of topics related to agency rule
drafting and statutory interpretation.!8 The survey is modeled on the pathbreak-
ing empirical work Lisa Bressman and Abbe Gluck have conducted on con-
15. The debate over the constitutional legitimacy of such broad delegation of lawmak-
ing authority to federal agencies, which lies outside the scope of this Article, is rich and on-
going. For a recent example, compare PHILIP HAMBURGER, Is ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL? (2014), with Gary Lawson, The Return of the King: The Unsavory Origins of
Administrative Law, 93 TEx. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2015) (reviewing HAMBURGER, su-
pra), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--2475853, and Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L.
REv. (forthcoming May 2015) (reviewing the same), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2488724. See also Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEo. L.J. 1003
(2015).
16. Terry M. Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 1, 3 (2006).
17. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501,537 (2005).
18. The survey consisted of thirty-five main questions, with twenty-three questions
containing three to thirty-three subquestions. In this Article, those questions (and the relevant
subquestions) are cited to with a prefix "Q." The survey is reproduced in the Appendix.
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gressional drafting, though it differs in substantial respects.19 The author ad-
ministered the survey during a five-month span at seven executive departments
(Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Ser-
vices, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation) and two inde-
pendent agencies (the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal
Reserve). Responses were received from 128 agency officials whose primary
duties included statutory interpretation and rulemaking (for a thirty-one percent
response rate). Although agency concerns for confidentiality placed methodo-
logical constraints on the study-including anonymity as to the individual re-
spondent and the respondent's respective agency-the findings shed considera-
ble light on agency rule drafting and the role of the canons, legislative history,
and administrative law doctrines in agency statutory interpretation.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview of the empiri-
cal study. Part I.A defines the scope of the study and situates it within the exist-
ing literature as the first comprehensive investigation into agency statutory in-
terpretation. Part I.B then details the survey methodology and its limitations,
with Part I.C introducing the background of the survey respondents. Part I.D
concludes by providing a 10,000-foot view of the survey findings-comparing
the interpretive tools explored in this survey based on the rule drafters' reported
familiarity with and use of those tools.
Part II presents the findings regarding the fifty-four questions asked about
the rule drafters' familiarity with and use of the canons of interpretation. The
canons are considered by many to be key indicia of interpreter fidelity because
they purport to reflect the meaning of the statutory language (semantic canons)
or at least what the words should mean in light of background principles (sub-
stantive canons). The rule drafters were generally more familiar with the se-
mantic canons by concept than by name, and this was particularly true of the
canons with Latin names. Of the ten semantic canons covered in the survey,
those most reported as used in interpretation are two pairs of related principles:.
the whole act rule and consistent usage canon; and noscitur a sociis (associated
words canon) and ejusdem generis (residual clause canon). The ordinary mean-
ing canon was another clear winner. By contrast, two related canons were gen-
erally known by name but rejected in practice: the whole code rule and in pari
materia (similar statutory provisions should be interpreted similarly). These
findings are similar in many respects to those in the Bressman and Gluck study
on congressional drafters, including the conclusion that dictionaries are not
used when drafting.20 But they also challenge some of those findings. The
19. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressnan, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons.' Part 1, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part 1]; Lisa Schultz Bressman &
Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congres-
sional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 11, 66 STAN. L. Rev. 725 (2014) [hereinaf
ter Bressman & Gluck, Part II].
20- Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 938.
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agency rule drafters, for instance, reported that they were more than twice as
amenable to using a dictionary when interpreting as opposed to when drafting.
Part 11. turns to the substantive canons. The federalism canons-the pre-
sumptions against preemption of state law and against the waiver of state sov-
ereign immunity-were the most known by the agency rule drafters surveyed
of the six substantive canons covered, followed by constitutional avoidance.
The agency rule drafters' reported use of the substantive canons, however, was
substantially lower, with the presumption against preemption the only one re-
ported as being used by more than a third of the rule drafters. These findings of
varied awareness and usage add to the ongoing debate about the role substan-
tive canons should play in agency statutory interpretation (and subsequent judi-
cial review).21
Part III explores the findings from the thirty-five questions on legislative
history and the role of federal agencies in the legislative process. With respect
to the legislative process as discussed in Part 1.A, nearly four in five rule
drafters reported that their agencies always or often participate in a technical
drafting role of statutes they administer, whereas three in five indicated that
their agencies similarly participate in a policy or substantive drafting role. The
rule drafters reported that their personal participation in the legislative process
was less involved, though still significant. The lower personal participation
may be explained in part by the organizational division in many agency general
counsel offices between the legislative affairs and regulation staffs.
Despite less personal participation in the legislative process, as discussed
in Part 11LB, three in four rule drafters considered legislative history useful in
interpreting statutes, and at least four in five agreed that legislative history
serves to explain the purposes of a statute and the meaning of particular terms
in a statute. Of over twenty interpretive principles included in the survey, legis-
lative history had the sixth-highest response for use in interpretation. Only
Chevron deference, the whole act rule, the ordinary meaning canon, the Mead
doctrine, and noscitur a sociis were reported by more rule drafters as being
used in their interpretation efforts. Similarly, as discussed in Part 1IIC, the rule
drafters surveyed demonstrated, on balance, a sound understanding of how to
assess the reliability of legislative history-including that committee and con-
ference reports are usually the most reliable and floor statements by nonspon-
sors the least reliable. Many rule drafters indicated that the timing of the legis-
lative history matters whereas whether a member of Congress drafted or even
21. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 330
(2000) (arguing that substantive canons trump Chevron), with Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin
E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GRo.L.J. 833, 915 (2001) (arguing that Chevron trumps
constitutional avoidance), Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review
of Administrative Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance,
64 ADMIN, L. REV. 139,143-44 (2012) (same), and Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Can-
ons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.L 64, 68-69 (2008) (arguing




read or heard the legislative history does not-findings consistent with those of
the congressional respondents in the Bressman and Gluck study. These findings
on legislative history and process-in particular, that federal agencies are heav-
ily involved in the legislative process and that agency rule drafters are experts
at using legislative history in interpretation-seem to support the scholarly call
for a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation (as compared
to a more textualist approach to judicial statutory interpretation).2 2
Part IV explores the relevant findings from the ninety-seven questions
asked on administrative law doctrines regarding congressional delegation and
the scope of federal agency interpretive authority.2 3 As set forth in Part IV.A,
much like the congressional respondents in the Bressman and Gluck study, the
agency rule drafters emphasized that federal agencies-not courts-are the
primary interpreters of statutes Congress has empowered them to administer. In
other words, it is more appropriate to focus on the relationship between Con-
gress and agencies, rather than on the relationship between Congress and the
courts. Unlike the congressional respondents, however, the agency rule drafters
seemed to perceive a more involved judicial role in agency statutory interpreta-
tion. The vast majority of rule drafters surveyed recognized that judicial review
plays a role in their interpretive efforts and that judicial views on the various
interpretive tools also influence the agency's rule-drafting process.
As detailed in Part IV.B, the agency rule drafters agreed with the congres-
sional respondents that Congress does not intend to delegate by ambiguity with
respect to all types of issues. Instead, the rule drafters generally believed that
Congress intends to delegate ambiguities relating to implementation details, ar-
eas within agency expertise, omissions in statutes, and even the agency's scope
of statutory authority or jurisdiction. By contrast, there was less consensus with
respect to ambiguities relating to major policy questions, preemption of state
law, and serious constitutional questions. These findings contribute to the con-
tinuing Chevron "Step Zero" debate about which ambiguities should signal a
delegation of lawmaking authority, and to the "Step One" debate about which
interpretive tools should be used to resolve statutory ambiguities.24
22. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Stat-
utes, 2013 Wis, L. REV. 411, 427; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91-99 (1985); Kevin M. Stack,
Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 Nw, U, L, REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with author); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Prima-
ry Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative
History, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L, REV. 885, 928 (2003).
23. The findings on the use of administrative law doctrines to shape agency interpre-
tive behavior are further explored in Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory
State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 703 (2014).
24. See Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking
Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 475, 477-84 (2014) (reviewing literature
on the Chevron Step Zero and Step One debates).
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Part IV.C turns to the rule drafters' familiarity with and use in drafting of
the administrative law deference doctrines. The rule drafters surveyed were
well aware of the Chevron deference standard-the tool cited most frequently
as known and used in drafting-as well as the less deferential Skidmore stand-
ard that generally applies when Chevron does not, Compared to Chevron, half
as many rule drafters confirmed that Auer/Seminole Rock deference-the rule
that agencies' interpretations of their own regulations are controlling unless
plainly erroneous-plays a role in their drafting decisions. Moreover, whereas
the Mead doctrine was not as well known by name, the rule drafters over-
whelmingly confirmed that the principles articulated in Mead-congressional
authorization of rulemaking or formal adjudication and the agency's use of it-
affect whether an agency's interpretation will receive Chevron deference.
Although this empirical study into agency statutory interpretation has its
methodological limitations and leaves many questions unanswered while rais-
ing additional questions for further research, it "provide[s] a crucial window"-
to borrow from Mashaw-"into the empirical realities of agency interpretive
practice"-at least with respect to agency statutory interpretation in the rule-
making context.2 5 The study reveals valuable insights into lawmaking by regu-
lation and should encourage further empirical and theoretical work. The find-
ings also underscore how our understanding of what it means for federal agen-
agencies to be faithful agents of Congress is greatly undertheorized. Indeed, as
outlined above and further discussed in the Article, the findings challenge some
theories on agency statutory interpretation while reinforcing others. And the
study sheds considerable light on the relationship between federal agencies,
Congress, and the courts from the vantage point of the rule drafters surveyed.
This Article focuses on fidelity in agency statutory interpretation, but the
findings have implications far beyond principal-agent theory. In addition to
contributing to the legal and political science literature on the modern adminis-
trative state, this unprecedented empirical look inside agency statutory interpre-
tation should be a valuable resource to a number of real-world audiences-the
congressional principal who wants to better "predict whether and how agencies
will interpret statutes";26 the agency general counsel who wants to train her rule
drafters based on current deficiencies in interpretive understanding and practic-
25. Mashaw, supra note 17, at 536-37. This study is limited to rulemaking, but agen-
cics also conduct statutory interpretation via adjudication, decisions to initiate enforcement,
informal guidance, and so forth. There may well be differences in interpretive practices de-
pending on which process is utilized. See Kevin M. Stack, Agency Statutory Interpretation
and Policymaking Form, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 225, 226 (exploring how "an agency's ap-
proach to statutory interpretation is in part a function of the policymaking form through
which it acts").
26, Bressman & Gluck, Parr II, supra note 19, at 767. Indeed, nearly two in five con-
gressional respondents (37%) volunteered this as a use of the canons, with the following rep-
resentative comment: "If you know the agency will use these interpretive principles they
matter absolutely because you want to know how they will be interpreted." Id. at 767-68 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
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es;27 and the judge who is faced with reviewing an agency statutory interpreta-
tion or interpreting a regulation-a subject that has been given so very little
scholarly attention.28 As Congress, courts, and scholars gain more insight into
how agencies understand and use the canons, legislative history, and judicial
deference doctrines in their interpretive efforts, the relationship between Con-
gress and federal agencies should improve, as should the ability of the judicial
branch, as another congressional agent, to better monitor and faithfully con-
strain lawmaking by regulation.
I. OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. Scope of Study and Relevant Literature
As set forth in the Introduction, Congress has delegated vast lawmaking
authority to federal agencies by statute. Under principal-agent theory, Congress
strives to ensure that federal agencies are its faithful agents when interpreting
those statutes. For legal academics, the concept of faithful agency is a familiar
one in statutory interpretation. But it is more often invoked when discussing the
relationship between Congress and courts, rather than between Congress and
federal agencies. Indeed, there is a robust literature and debate on these matters
of interpretation, including whether textualism or purposivism better advances
the judicial role as a faithful congressional agent.2 9 As Bressman and Gluck
have remarked in this judicial context, "the faithful-agent concept provides an
extremely broad umbrella for the application of many different kinds of inter-
pretive rules."30
Far less theoretical or empirical work, however, has been done with respect
to interpretation inside the regulatory state. As Mashaw observed nearly a dec-
ade ago, "virtually no one has even asked, much less answered, some simple
questions about agency statutory interpretation." In his preliminary inquiry
into the matter, Mashaw found "persuasive grounds for believing that legiti-
mate techniques and standards for agency statutory interpretation diverge
sharply from the legitimate techniques and standards for judicial statutory in-
27. At least a half-dozen agency general counsels or deputies agreed to participate in
large part so that they could better train their rule drafters based on the results.
28. See Stack, supra note 2, at 357 ("While all agree that regulations are primary
sources of law, strikingly little attention has been devoted to the method of their interpreta-
tion."). Indeed, certain questions asked in the survey address how courts should approach
regulatory interpretation, including Kevin Stack's pioneering theory for interpreting regula-
tions. Those questions (Q34(a)-(d)) will be addressed in subsequent work.
29. For a helpful overview on the debate between textualism and purposivism, see
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Con-
sensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE LJ. 1750, 1761-68 (20 10).
30. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 913; see also id, at 912-19 (providing
an overview of faithful agency in the judicial statutory interpretation context).
31. Mashaw, supra note 17, at 501-02; see also id. at 502 n.2 (reviewing literature).
1008 [Vol. 67:999
May 2015J INSIDE AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
terpretation."32 After theorizing about interpretive norms and practices at the
agency level, he concluded that answers to the normative questions about ap-
propriate (or faithful) agency statutory interpretation require a missing empiri-
cal foundation into the "realities of agency interpretive practice."3
The theoretical work to date mainly proceeds in this manner with calls to
adapt traditional statutory interpretation conducted by courts by relying on the
comparative expertise-or the unique "interpretive voice"34 of federal agen-
cies. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, have argued that "atten-
tion to institutional considerations can show why agencies might be given the
authority to abandon textualism even if courts should be denied that authori-
ty."3 William Eskridge has advanced a somewhat analogous position: "[R]ead
statutes broadly, in light of their purposes, and follow a quasi-legislative politi-
cal process for interpretations addressing big policy questions or arenas not re-
solved by the statute."3 6 Mashaw, Peter Strauss, and others have reached con-
clusions along similar comparative expertise lines.37 In sum, the theoretical
development of agency statutory interpretation remains in its early stages, and
metrics for assessing faithful agency interpretation are even more infant.3 8
32. Id. at 504, Additional literature regarding agency interpreters' use of specific
tools-such as legislative history, the substantive canons, and the administrative law doc-
trines-are addressed in the relevant Parts of this Article.
33. Id. at 537.
34. Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005)
(asserting that interpretation should "consider[| not only the abilities and limitations of
courts and administrative agencies, but also how both of these institutions express their con-
clus ions; that is, the relationship between what they do and what they say they do").
35. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 22, at 928; accord ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 206 (2006);
see also Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952,952-53 (2003) (agreeing that there is an institu-
tional dimension of legal interpretation but disagreeing that this is a novel insight, as schol-
ars and judges have long considered this institutional dimension),
36. Eskridge, supra note 22, at 427.
37. Mashaw, supra note 22, at 91-99 (arguing that delegation of policy decisions to
agencies is better than delegation to courts based on comparative accountability, responsive-
ness, and legitimacy); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Admin-
istrative State, 89 GEo, LJ. 97, 134-41 (2000) (arguing on public choice grounds that law-
making delegation to agencies is comparatively better than such delegation to courts);
Strauss, supra note 22, at 321-22 (arguing that "the use of legislative history may have an
importance in the agency context for maintaining law against politics, however one regards
its use at the judicial level"); Walker, supra note 21, at 159-61 (arguing for comparative
agency expertise in the context of avoiding constitutional questions). In an important forth-
coming article, Stack further develops a purposivist model for agency statutory interpreta-
tion. See Stack, supra note 22.
38. The same is true for judicial interpretation of agency regulations. In proposing a
purposivist approach for interpreting regulations that relies more heavily on regulations' ex-
press statements of basis and purpose, Stack recently observed that "theorizing about how a
court-or any other legal actor, for that matter-should interpret regulations has attracted
only occasional notice, especially in comparison to the volume of legal work devoted to fig-
uring out how to comply with regulations." Stack, supra note 2, at 358 (footnote omitted);
see also id. at 358 n.7 (noting that "[t]he most helpful descriptive accounts are more than a
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As for empirical studies, even less work has been done. Sunstein and Ver-
meule have remarked that "[plrecisely because the empirical study of interpre-
tation remains in an extremely primitive state, there is every reason to think that
much will be gained by further empirical efforts." 9 The most comprehensive
study on interpretation to date is the Bressman and Gluck study on congres-
sional drafters, in which the authors asked 137 congressional staffers 171 ques-
tions about statutory interpretation.40 Bressman and Gluck observed that "there
has been almost no other empirical research of this kind" with the exception of
one prior, more limited study of eighteen congressional staffers by Victoria
Nourse and Jane Schacter.4 1
With respect to administrative law, more empirical work has been done,
but such work has focused on how courts review administrative interpretations
of law,42 as well as how Congress delegates authority to federal agencies.43
generation out of date" and citing John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM, L. REv. 612 (1996), Frank
C. Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 509 (1947), Lars Noah,
Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 255, 306-22 (2000), and Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation ofAdmin-
istrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CN. L. REV. 681 (1984)); see also Manning, su-
pra, at 688 n.359 ("Detailed consideration of the relative legitimacy and utility of particular
approaches to [regulatory interpretation] is for another day,"). Although not the central focus
of this Article, the findings reported herein shed considerable mpirical light on that subject
as well.
39. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 22, at 919. The empirical projects Sunstein and
Vermeule suggested, see id. at 917-19, do not encompass the study presented in this Article.
But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 66 U. CHI. L. REv, 671, 675 (1999) (noting difficulties in conducting such empirical
studies); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REv.
636, 642 (1999) ("The principal qualification to my basic thesis-that formalism must be
defended empirically-comes from the fact that without normative claims of some kind, it is
impossible to know what counts as a 'mistake' or an 'injustice' in interpretation....");
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation, Empiricism, and the Closure Problem, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
698, 701 (1999) ("Many of the empirical questions relevant to the choice of interpretive doc-
trines are ... unanswerable, at least at an acceptable level of cost or within a useful period of
time.").
40. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 905-06.
41. Id. at 909-10 (citing Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legis-
lative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y .U. L. REv. 575 (2002)); see also id. at
916-19 (discussing empirical work in more detail).
42. For empirical studies at the Supreme Court level, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. 1083 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969 (1992); Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An Empirical Investigation of Chev-
ron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (2006); and Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chev-
ron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency
Deference Cases, 110 CoLUM. L. REv. 1727 (2010). For similar studies at the court of ap-
peals level, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review ofAgency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1443 (2005); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In
Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); Orin S. Kerr,
Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts
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Terrific studies on particular agency practices have also been conducted,44
though none has looked specifically at how agencies interpret statutes they ad-
minister. Indeed, little, if any, empirical work has been undertaken to under-
stand what federal agencies consider when interpreting the statutes they admin-
ister.
The underexamined state of agency statutory interpretation is particularly
noteworthy in light of one of the main conclusions from the Bressman and
Gluck study on congressional drafting: "[C]urrent theory and doctrine are fo-
cusing on the wrong cues and the wrong relationships."4 5 The congressional
drafters surveyed "resisted" the theory that "Congress is in some kind of dia-
logue with courts-be it a principal-agent relationship, a partnership, or a rule-
of-law relationship."46 To the contrary, they "saw agencies as the everyday
statutory interpreters, viewed interpretive rules as tools for agencies, too, and
made no distinction, as some scholars have, between agency statutory 'imple-
mentation' and agency statutory 'interpretation.' 4 7 In other words, the con-
gressional drafters surveyed "saw their primary interpretive relationship as one
with agencies, not courts"8 -suggesting that study of the relationship between
Congress and federal agencies is just as important as, if not more so than, that
of any relationship between Congress and the courts.
That congressional drafters may view their relationship with federal agen-
cies as more direct and personal than their relationship with courts is not too
surprising. After all, Congress delegates lawmaking authority directly to federal
agencies as a matter of course during the legislative process. As Mashaw has
concluded, "In some sense, the position of agencies as 'faithful agents' of the
legislature has a constitutional clarity that exceeds that of the judiciary."4 9
Moreover, Strauss has observed that the Congress-agency relationship is more
of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998); and Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
See also Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 INo. L.J. 605, 634-42 (2014)
(surveying Chevron deference in the Supreme Court and courts of appeals).
43. Such studies on delegation tend to come more from political scientists. See, e.g.,
DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST
PoLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999); DAVID E. LEWIS,
PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997 (2003); McCubbins & Schwartz, supra
note 7; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process, supra note 7, at 468-8J; Terry
M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267
(John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
44. For a classic example, see JERRY L. MASHAw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983). For a more recent example, see Jaya Ramji-
Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295
(2007).
45. Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 765.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 767.
49. Mashaw, supra note 17, at 505.
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direct due to the agency's expert role in the legislative process: "The agency
may have helped to draft the statutory language, and was likely present and at-
tentive throughout its legislative consideration. Its views about statutory mean-
ing may have been shaped in the immediate wake of enactment, under the en-
acting Congress's watchful eye."50
Accordingly, the case for more empirical investigation into agency statuto-
ry interpretation is an easy one to make. Deciding what and how to investigate,
however, is much more difficult. For instance, there is a great divide in statuto-
ry interpretation as to what constitutes fidelity, with the predominant camps be-
ing textualism and purposivism.5 1 And who the assessor of fidelity is also mat-
ters: whether she is a textualist or purposivist judge, a scholar advocating for an
even less textually constrained interpretive practice for agency interpretation,52
or a congressional drafter who views legislative history and process as perhaps
the best guide for fidelity to congressional wishes.5 3 Fidelity in agency statuto-
ry interpretation is indeed in the eye of the beholder-a beholder (or beholders)
whose preferences are perhaps not fully understood as an empirical matter.54
This study does not take sides on which is the appropriate approach for as-
sessing fidelity in agency statutory interpretation. Instead, it explores a variety
of different metrics, which can be grouped into three broad categories:
(1) awareness and use of the canons of statutory interpretation, which judges
have developed and utilize in part based on faithful-agent theories (Part II);
(2) awareness and use of legislative history and related legislative process tools
(Part III); and (3) awareness and use of administrative law doctrines that may
reflect when and how much discretion Congress (the principal) intends to dele-
gate to a federal agency (its agent) (Part IV). How these interpretive tools and
doctrines may measure agency fidelity is explored in more detail in the relevant
Parts of the Article.
In light of the undertheorized state of agency statutory interpretation and
the pioneering nature of this empirical study, each and every one of the 195
questions asked may not be too helpful for any interpretive method. With hind-
sight, some could have been omitted or at least framed differently; and un-
50. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron
Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2012); accord Strauss,
supra note 22, at 329-31; see also Christopher J. Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery,
91 TEx. L. REv. SEE ALSO 73, 79 (2013), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads
/Walker.pdf.
51. See Gluck, supra note 29, at 1761-68 (surveying the debate).
52. See sources cited supra notes 34-37,
53. For instance, the Bressman and Gluck study found that "[m]ore than 94% of [the
congressional drafters surveyed] said that the purpose of legislative history is to shape the
way that agencies interpret statutory ambiguities." Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note
19, at 768. The use of legislative history is discussed in more detail in Part Ii,
54. Indeed, using the findings of the Bressman and Gluck study on congressional
drafting, James Brudney has succinctly demonstrated how a court's assessment of interpreter
fidelity would arguably differ from Congress's. See James J. Brudney, Faithful Agency Ver-
sus Ordinary Meaning Advocacy, 57 ST. Louis U. LJ. 975 (2013).
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doubtedly, other questions should have been asked. The Article notes where
that is the case and suggests additional lines of inquiry for subsequent investi-
gation. Moreover, even the answers that this empirical study does provide may
well be incomplete in light of the numerous other factors unaddressed by the
study that influence the drafting process. The Article's main ambition is for its
preliminary findings to lead to further theoretical development and empirical
investigation into agency statutory interpretation.
B. Survey Methodology
The methodology for this empirical study on agency rule drafting is based
in large part on the 171-question survey recently conducted by Bressman and
Gluck of 137 congressional staffers.55 Indeed, for comparison purposes be-
tween congressional and agency drafters, many of the questions were asked
verbatim in this survey. Some questions in the Bressman and Gluck study were
excluded from this study, including questions about federalism, clear statement
rules, legislative processes, and legislative counsel. Conversely, this survey in-
cluded substantially more questions about the drafters' awareness and use of
various administrative law doctrines as well as the rule-drafting process more
generally. In particular, nearly half of the questions (97 of 195) dealt with ad-
ministrative law doctrines, whereas the Bressman and Gluck study included 45
questions on administrative law.56 Many of these additional questions borrow
from Mashaw's framework for empirical investigation of agency statutory in-
terpretation s-though much, much more needs to be done to explore the ques-
tions he has posed.
The Bressman and Gluck methodology also had to be adapted to the feder-
al agency context, where the pool of potential respondents is spread across
hundreds of federal agencies and offices, and adequate access to that pool
would require approval from the agency and not just the individual respondent.
Accordingly, over the span of nine months, the author reached out to officials
at every executive department and a dozen or so independent agencies (roughly
every independent agency with substantial rulemaking authority)- meeting in
person, by phone, and via e-mail to design the survey instrument and enlist
their participation in the study. Ultimately, various agencies and offices at sev-
en executive departments and two independent agencies agreed to participate.5 8
55, See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 919-24.
56, Id. at 992.
57. See Mashaw, supra note 17, at 522 tbl.1 (detailing ten "Canons for Institutionally
Responsible Statutory Interpretation").
58. A total of forty-one offices and agencies were included in the survey, with the
breakdown by department and independent agency as follows (total population sent survey
in parentheses):
US. Department of Agriculture (USDA) (55): Office of General Counsel and eight-
een USDA agencies and offices (for example, Food Safety and Inspection Service,
Forest Service, and Office of Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis);
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The point persons at each agency then helped determine the population of
agency officials with experience in statutory interpretation and rulemaking.5 9
Some departments limited the survey population to particular agencies or offic-
es, but within those populations the survey was sent to all officials with experi-
ence in statutory interpretation and rulemaking. Despite all agency rule draft-
ers at these agencies receiving the survey, not every executive department,
much less every federal agency, agreed to participate. So the generalizability of
the survey's findings is limited by whether the surveyed agencies constitute a
fair representation of agencies overall. 61 Whereas the relatively large sample
* U.S. Department of Commerce (13): Office of General Counsel, Commerce Bureau
of Industry and Security, and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office;
* U.S. Department of Energy (18): Office of General Counsel;
* U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (55): Office of General Counsel,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Coast Guard;
* U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (146): Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) and Public Health Division;
* U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (10): Office of General Coun-
sel;
* U.S. Department of Transportation (81): Office of the Secretary, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal
Railroad Administration, Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration,
Federal Transit Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, and Federal
Highway Administration;
* Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (16): Office of General Counsel; and
* Federal Reserve (17): Legal Division. Unlike the other agencies surveyed, to reduce
the workload on the Legal Division, the Federal Reserve only sent the survey to a
seventeen-person subset of potential rule drafters, selected randomly by the point of
contact from the population agency officials engaged in rule drafting on a regular
basis.
59. Question I confirmed and clarified the survey population by asking whether the
respondent is "currently working, or ha(s] worked within the last two years, in a general
counsel office, legal department, or other rulemaking office in a federal agency AND had
experience in statutory interpretation and rulemaking in that employment." Of the 128 indi-
viduals who responded, only one answered this question in the negative and thus did not re-
spond to the rest of the survey beyond the background questions.
60. Once the rule-drafter populations were defined at each agency, the point person at
the agency c-mailed the population a link to the online survey with a short description of the
empirical project, encouraging but not requiring a response. The agency point persons then
followed up roughly two weeks later with another invitation via e-mail, and a final reminder
about two weeks after that.
61. See generally FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH METHODs 9-11 (5th ed.
2014) (summarizing the broad scope of biases that need to be considered by describing two
types of errors that can be made in conducting a survey: (1) errors in generalizing from the
set of individuals who completed the survey to the population of interest and (2) mismatch
between the information reported by the survey and the actual reality being measured). One
could imagine a strong selection bias at the agency participation level. For instance, perhaps
agencies whose rules are challenged more in court-and thus whose rule drafters may be
more familiar with these interpretive tools-would be less likely to agree to participate in the
survey. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, for example, declined to participate. The EPA actually agreed to participate but
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size, the fairly diverse set of participating agencies, and the high response rate
may counteract some of those limitations, the Article errs on the side of caution
and presents these findings descriptively only as to the rule drafters surveyed.
The online survey consisted of thirty-five primary questions, many of
which had multiple subquestions, for a total of 195 questions.62 As a condition
for participation, the agencies required that the survey be anonymous as to both
the respondent and the respondent's agency and that the survey be conducted
online rather than in person, the approach utilized in the Bressman and Gluck
study.6 3 The data collection took place on a rolling basis by agency over a five-
month period from July to November 2013. In total, 411 agency officials re-
ceived the survey and 128 responded, resulting in a 31% response rate.6 Of the
did not want to burden its entire rule-drafting staff with the survey, and so suggested survey-
ing a handpicked subset-an offer refused so as to not undercut the methodology. On the
other hand, many litigation-heavy agencies (for example, DHS, the FCC, and the FDA) did
participate. Moreover, a number of the agencies agreed to participate based on a level of
trust they had with the author. Once a few agreed to participate, more agencies where the
author's personal connections were weaker or nonexistent were willing. Many of the agen-
cies-including most of the independent agencies-that declined to participate indicated
they did not want to burden their rule drafters with a survey, especially as the survey was
being administered during the government-wide hiring freeze (and then furlough).
62. Because many questions build on prior questions and in light of concerns about in-
complete surveys, the thirty-five main questions were asked in a fixed order; subquestions
were randomized within each main question to minimize response-order effects. See, e.g.,
Jon A. Krosnick & Duane F. Al win, An Evaluation of a Cognitive Theory of Response-Order
Effects in Survey Measurement, 51 PUB. OP. Q. 201 (1987); William S. Sekely & Vicki L.
Blakney, The Effect of Response Position on Trade Magazine Readership and Usage, J.
ADVER. RES., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 53. There are methodological costs to not fully randomiz-
ing the survey in that the order may affect the answers, though such effects are typically
more an issue with attitudinal studies (which this is not). See generally HOWARD SCHUMAN
& STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN ATTrruDE SURVEYS: ExPERIMENTS ON
QUESTION FORM, WORDING, AND CONTEXT (1981). Moreover, Bressman and Gluck found no
response-order effects when they scrambled the questions in their related congressional
drafting survey. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory interpretation frorn
the Inside: Methods Appendix, STAN. L. REv. 12 & n.45 (May 2013), http://www.stanford
lawreview.org/prinr/article/statutory-interpretation-inside-methods-appendix [hereinafter
Methods Appendix]. To help the reader account for any response-order effects, the Article
references the question number being discussed, with the full survey reproduced in the Ap-
pendix.
63. With the exception of the FDA, the federal agencies insisted not only that the sur-
vey be anonymous but also that a critical mass of other agencies participate. Attempts were
made to conduct smaller case studies on particular agencies, but agencies resisted that idea.
64. The anonymous nature of the survey limits the ability to calculate a response rate
by agency or department. However, because the survey was rolled out at different times at
different agencies, the data collected confirm that at least some individuals in all of the popu-
lation pools responded (as opposed to being predominated by one department or independent
agency). That said, there is no way to assess with precision whether the response rate differs
across the agencies contacted. As a result, it is possible that nonresponse bias is strong with-
in a single agency due to cultural or other factors. Moreover, the FDA requested that its rule
drafters have the option to indicate that they work at the FDA, so the first question was mod-
ified to allow for the respondents to voluntarily so indicate. Of the 128 responses, twenty
indicated that they worked at the FDA. The survey was sent to seventy FDA rule drafters, so
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respondents, 98 (77%) answered each and every question.65 The survey also
allowed the respondents to make additional comments on most questions, and
the dataset includes 345 such comments.
Before turning to the findings, it is important to underscore that, as with
any survey that attempts to understand human behavior, one should be careful
in reading too much into the rule drafters' responses. Indeed, because of the
methodological limitations imposed by the participating agencies-including
the anonymous nature of the survey and a limited sampling of agencies 66and
the exploratory nature of the study, the Article limits itself to presenting a de-
scriptive picture of these particular 128 agency rule drafters. (The Bressman
and Gluck study took the same approach.)67 That said, this study is the most
extensive inquiry into actual agency interpretive practices to date, and the raw
numbers provide a unique window into lawmaking in the regulatory state,
C. The 128 Rule Drafters Surveyed
The agency rule drafters who responded to the survey reflect diverse expe-
rience and backgrounds, and many have extensive experience in statutory in-
assuming all FDA respondents self-identified, the FDA response rate was 27%, which is in
line with the overall 31% response rate.
65. The answers from respondents who did not fully complete the survey are included
in the findings. A sizeable number of respondents (thirty) provided only partial responses.
This rate might indicate that the survey was intimidating to individuals who did not possess a
strong grasp of the concepts being discussed, resulting in undersampling of less knowledge-
able individuals at the agencies. Another plausible explanation is that some respondents tired
of the 195-question survey, as there does not appear to be any pattern about when respond-
ents stopped answering questions. Because the main thirty-five questions were not random-
ized (though the subquestions were), see supra note 62, the undersampling can be taken into
account and the total number of respondents "(n=_)" will be included for each question.
66. These, of course, are not the only methodological limitations. For instance, there is
always the possibility of social desirability bias, in that respondents might feel they should
indicate greater familiarity with the interpretive tools (and greater use of them) than they ac-
tually possess (and do), since they might view it as the most appropriate way to conduct their
jobs. The tendency to modify answers in this way arises from two sources, termed "self-
deception" and "other-deception." See Harold A. Sackeim & Ruben C. Gur, Self-Deception,
Self-Confrontation, and Consciousness, in 2 CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-REGULATION:
ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 139,142-50 (Gary E. Schwartz & David Shapiro eds.,
1978). Attempts were made to minimize social desirability bias. As for other-deception, the
survey was completely anonymous and taken online outside the presence of an interviewer;
as for self-deception, the survey was designed to ask about the same interpretive tools in dif-
ferent ways, by name and by principle. See Anton J. Nederhof, Methods of Coping with So-
cial Desirability Bias: A Review, 15 EUR, J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 263 (1985). As discussed in
notes 61-65 above, there may also be issues with selection bias, incomplete surveys, nonran-
domization of main questions order, and other biases that the study has attempted to mini-
mize but nonetheless cannot be completely controlled or measured through the methodology
utilized.
67. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 923 ("Out of an abundance of
caution, moreover, we have chosen to report our findings in a descriptive manner mostly us-
ing only the raw data rather than engaging in more sophisticated hypothesis testing to ex-
plore whether there were statistically significant drivers of certain answers.").
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terpretation and rulemaking. Here are the highlights: All are career civil serv-
ants as opposed to political appointees,68 and all but eleven went to law
school.6 9 Nearly two-thirds have worked at a federal agency in a capacity that
includes some rulemaking work for at least five years.70 About two in five re-
spondents (39%) have had a role in the drafting process of at least a dozen
rules, with another 16% in the seven to eleven range, 25% in the three to six
range, and most of the rest (17%) in the zero to two range.7 ' One respondent,
for instance, indicated involvement in "over 500 rulemaking actions"; another
indicated that "[j]ust in the past 7 years, it has been 80 rules between proposed
rules, interim rules, and final rules"; and a third indicated that the number of
rules was "too numerous to count."72 Moreover, 38% of the respondents are
over the age of forty-five, 51% are between thirty-one and forty-five, and the
remaining 11% are between twenty-two and thirty?3 Four in ten respondents
(42%) took a course in law school that focused on legislation, statutory inter-
pretation, or statutory drafting, whereas approximately half (49%) did not take
such a course.74 Only one in four respondents (25%) have taken such a course
outside of law school-many via continuing legal education or government
training programs.75
At the end of the survey, the rule drafters were asked whether they consider
themselves "strong" or "moderate" purposivists or textualists. These terms
were not otherwise mentioned or defined in the survey. Half of the rule drafters
identified as textualist-35% "moderate textualist" and 15% "strong textual-
ist." About one in four identified as purposivist- 19% "moderate purposivist"
and only 3% "strong purposivist." Perhaps significantly, 21% indicated they
did not know, and another 6% indicated "other," with answers in the comments
that they are both or that it depends on the context.76 One comment may be il-
lustrative of the "other" rule drafters: "I start with the text, but keeping in mind
the context (which I guess is what you mean by purpose). I want to say that I'm
a moderate text/purpose hybrid."7 Another may reflect those who chose either
of the two "moderate" labels: "The text ALWAYS comes first. But Congress




71. Q4 (n=128). Another five respondents indicated "other," explaining among other
things that it depends on how "rule" is defined. See, e.g., id. cmt. 9.
72. Id. cmts. 3, 10, 11.
73. Q5 (n=126). The survey also asked what year the respondent graduated from law
school (Q6), and such results are consistent with the age ranges.
74. Q7.
75. Q8 (n=126).
76. Q35 (n=98). Because asking whether someone is a textualist or purposivist could
affect how respondents would answer other questions regarding their understanding and use
of a variety of semantic and substantive canons and legislative history, this question was in-
tentionally included as the last question in the survey.
77. Id. cmt. 7.
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sense and agency expertise to fill in the blanks. If Congress wrote better stat-
utes, I'd be a stronger textualist. But they don't, which leaves me only a mod-
erate one."78
D. The 10,000-Foot View
In addition to the nine questions on their background discussed in Part I.C,
the survey asked rule drafters fifty-four questions about the canons, thirty-five
on legislative history, and ninety-seven on the administrative law doctrines.
The Introduction presents the highlights for each set of questions, which will
not be repeated here, and Parts II, III, and IV, respectively, explore those in
great detail. Before getting into the details, however, it may be helpful to pro-
vide the 10,000-foot view. The following two Figures attempt to do that.
Figure 1 presents the agency rule drafters' responses as to their knowledge
of the various interpretive tools by name, along with the responses for these
same questions from the congressional drafters surveyed in the Bressman and
Gluck study.79 This Article repeatedly references the findings from their study
on congressional drafting, so that those congressional drafters' expectations can
be compared with the rule drafters' perspectives here. In some ways this com-
parison is easy to make as many questions were asked verbatim to both groups.
But the comparison should be made carefully and descriptively, as neither the
Bressman and Gluck study nor this study purports to generalize its findings to
the larger drafting populations (all congressional drafters and all agency rule
drafters, respectively) and the methodologies differ in substantial respects (in-
cluding in-person versus online surveying, respectively).8 0
Indeed, the comparison between the agency and congressional respondents
should be done cautiously for the additional reason that these two drafting pop-
ulations differ in substantial respects. In the Bressman and Gluck study, 106 of
the 137 congressional respondents were political staffers serving on congres-
sional committees, whereas the remainder were nonpartisan drafters-28 of
whom worked in the Offices of the House and Senate Legislative Counsel.8 1
By contrast, as detailed in Part I.B-C, the agency rule drafters surveyed here are
all career civil servants at various federal agencies. Like the Bressman and
Gluck study, this study targeted the population with the greatest likelihood of
78. Id. cmt. 12.
79. Q9(a)-(h) (n=119); Q17(a)-(d) (n=109); Q24(a)-(f) (n-99); Gluck & Bressman,
Part I, supra note 19, at 927 fig.1, 946, 948, With respect to some findings in the Bressman
and Gluck study, the exact percentages of congressional respondents were not reported. In
those circumstances, Bressman and Gluck graciously provided the author with those per-
centages. Thanks are owed to their research assistant Adriana Robertson for confirming
those numbers from the Bressman and Gluck data for the purposes of this Article. Two of
these interpretive rules-the ordinary meaning canon and the Seminole Rock/Auer deference
doctrine-were not included in the Bressman and Gluck study.
80. See supra Part IB (describing differences in methodologies).
81. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 920, 921 & tbl1.
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substantial experience in drafting and interpretation. But unlike the Bressman
and Gluck study, none of the agency respondents is a political appointee; in-
deed, the agency respondents seem more like the 28 congressional respondents
who worked in the nonpartisan drafting Offices of the House and Senate Legis-
lative Counsel, In other words, the comparison of these two drafting popula-
tions is probably not too helpful if one is trying to compare how each institu-
tion-Congress and the regulatory state-knows or uses certain interpretive
tools. Aside from the methodological limitations discussed above, these two
populations arguably are not similarly situated or motivated within their respec-
tive institutions, such that their responses may reflect their different roles and
incentives. That said, the comparison still provides a useful baseline and point
of reference, and it also sheds at least some (methodologically limited) light on
the interpreter fidelity questions of whether the career agency rule drafters sur-
veyed use the interpretive tools in ways similar to the Bressman and Gluck
congressional respondents.
FIGURE 1
Knowledge of Interpretive Tools by Name
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Figure 2 presents the findings with respect to the rule drafters' reported use
of the interpretive tools explored in this study.8 2 These findings are reported as
the percentage of rule drafters who indicated that they use these tools when in-
terpreting statutes or drafting rules. Figure 2 reports the rule drafters' indication
of use of the interpretive principle by name-except where indicated with an
asterisk, in which case the use is reported by concept.3
FIGURE 2
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II. THE CANONS
This Part presents the responses to fifty-four questions posed to the agency
rule drafters about the canons of construction, which are "interpretive princi-
82. QI0(a) (n=I 19); Q13(a)-(d) (n= 117); Q14(a)-(e) (n=114); Q18(a)-(b), (d) (n=109);
Q19(a)-(b) (n=92); Q25(b)-(f) (n=99); Q31 (n=98). For readability, the following interpre-
tive principles are not included in Figure 2: Rule of Lenity (13%), and Curtiss-Wright defer-
ence (2%). Ql8(e) (n=109); Q25(a) (n=99).
83. For canons reported by concept, use is calculated by including those who respond-
ed that those concepts were always or often true. See Q13(a)-(d) (n=1 17); Q14(a)-(e)
(n=1 14). The Mead doctrine is calculated by concept by taking the lower percentage reported
of the two conditions. Q19(a)-(b) (n=92).
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ples or presumptions that judges use to discern-or, at times, to construct-
statutory meaning."8 4 These canons can be divided into two groups: the seman-
tic or textual canons (Part IIA), and the substantive or normative canons (Part
II.B).
The canons are considered by many to be key indicia of interpreter fidelity.
They purport to reflect either the meaning of the statutory language (semantic
canons) or at least what the words should mean in light of background princi-
ples (substantive canons). Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner have re-
marked that "[tihe canons influence not just how courts approach texts but also
the techniques that legal drafters follow in preparing those texts.8 5 Faithful-
agency justifications for the canons include that they reflect the ordinary mean-
ing of words at the time,86 constitute background principles against which
Congress drafts,87 or are "rules with such established common law pedigrees
that it is assumed everyone knows them."88 As Bressman and Gluck have
chronicled, "[s]ome justifications turn expressly on congressional awareness
and use of the canons."89 Justice Frankfurter's observation in 1947 still rings
true today: "Insofar as canons of construction are generalizations of experience,
they all have worth."90
That said, as is well chronicled in the literature, not everyone agrees that
the canons advance a faithful-agency approach to statutory interpretation or re-
flect the empirical realities of congressional drafting. Judge Abner Mikva, for
instance, once quipped, "When I was in Congress, the only 'canons' we talked
84. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 202 (2d ed. 2013); accord ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 51 (2012) ("Most of the canons of in-
terpretation . . .are so venerable that many of them continue to bear their Latin names.
Properly regarded, they are not 'rules' of interpretation in any strict sense but presumptions
about what an intelligently produced text conveys.").
85. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 61.
86. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch
Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1199, 1203 (2010); James J. Brudney & Curey
Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND, L.
REV. 1, 12 (2005).
87. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Continuity and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1863, 1864-65 (2004); John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in
an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 771, 801-02.
88. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 925 (citing Antonin Scalia, Common-
Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAw 3, 29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)).
89. Id. Other justifications "are less tethered to congressional practice." Id.
90. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 544 (1947); accord JOEL PRENTISS B [SHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION § 2, at 3 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1882) ("[Oln the whole, the
rules of statutory interpretation are specially stable.").
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about were the ones the Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight."' The
polarized reaction to Scalia and Garner's 2012 statutor interpretation treatise
Reading Law92 is emblematic of the scholarly debate. And sixty-five years
later scholars are still responding to Karl Llewellyn's classic cannoning of the
canons, in which he detailed how "there are two opposing canons on almost
every point." 94 Indeed, Scalia and Garner's most recent response to Llewellyn
is to create a new canon-the "Principle of Interrelating Canons," which in-
structs that "[njo canon of interpretation is absolute. Each may be overcome by
the strength of differing principles that point in other directions."9 5
This Article does not weigh in on the debate about which canons should be
utilized to assess whether an interpreter is a faithful agent of Congress. Instead,
this Part merely reports the findings with respect to the rule drafters surveyed
as to their awareness and use of the canons, along with some descriptive com-
parisons to the views of the Bressman and Gluck congressional respondents.
A. The Semantic Canons
As John Manning and Matthew Stephenson have explained, the semantic
canons "are generalizations about how the English language is conventionally
used and understood, which judges may use to 'decode' statutory terms. The
use of semantic canons can therefore be understood simply as a form of textual
analysis."9 6 Justice Scalia has added that semantic canons are "so commonsen-
sical that, were the canons not couched in Latin, you would find it hard to be-
lieve anyone could criticize them."9 7 As discussed, however, many scholars
dispute whether these canons are grounded in how Congress actually legislates,
Judge Posner is perhaps the loudest modem critic, calling the canons
"[v]acuous and inconsistent" and "just plain wrong."9 And the findings from
91. Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. Pirr. L. REv. 627, 629
(1987); accord James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 OHIo ST.
LJ. 149, 179, 180 & n.1 13 (2003) (questioning congressional awareness of canons).
92. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84.
93. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 912, 913 & n.16 (chronicling the
debate); see also Josh Blackman, Archive of Articles Discussing Posner-Scalia Disagree-
ment, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG, http://joshblackman.com/blog/category/articles/posner-v
-scalia (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).
94. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND, L, REV. 395, 401 (1950). See
generally MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 84, at 205-07 (discussing the impact of
Llewellyn's criticism of the canons and subsequent scholarship).
95. SCAuA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 59 (bolding omitted).
96. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 84, at 202.
97. Scalia, supra note 88, at 26.
98, Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 800, 806, 816 (1983); see also Cont'1 Cas. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corn-
ing Corp., 917 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1990) (calling the canons "figleaves for decisions
reached on other grounds").
1022 [Vol. 67.999
May 20151 INSIDE AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
the Bressman and Gluck study, discussed below, cast further doubt on the use-
fulness of at least some of these canons for gauging interpreter fidelity.
This survey asked agency rule drafters thirty-five questions about the se-
mantic canons. The survey first asked for the drafters' familiarity with and use
of certain canons-"the six textual canons most commonly deployed by courts
and scholars"99-by name and then by concept:
* Noscitur a sociis (construe ambiguous terms in a list in reference to oth-
er terms on the list);
* Ejusdem generis (construe general, often catch-all, terms in a list in ref-
erence to other, more specific, terms in a list);
* Expressio/inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of specific
terms or exceptions indicates an intent to exclude terms or exceptions
not included);
* The rule against superfluities (construe statutes to avoid redundancy;
when there are two overlapping terms, construe to give an independent
meaning to each);
* The whole act rule (statutory terms are presumed to have a consistent
meaning throughout a statute); and
* The whole code rule (statutory terms are presumed to have a consistent
meaning throughout the U.S. Code).0 0
As in the Bressman and Gluck study, the rule drafters were also asked about in
pari materia (similar statutory provisions should be interpreted similarly)101 as
well as about their use of dictionaries when drafting.102 Unlike the Bressman
and Gluck study, the rule drafters were asked if they knew and used the ordi-
nary meaning canon (by name only)103 as well as a follow-up question on the
use of dictionaries when interpreting 1 04
The overall results on the semantic canons are reported in the following
two Figures. Figure 3 presents the agency rule drafters' responses as to the
knowledge of the semantic canons by name, along with the responses from the
Bressman and Gluck congressional drafters for these same questions.105 As
Figure 3 illustrates, a somewhat larger fraction of the agency rule drafters sur-
99. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 930.
100. Q9(b)-(e), (g)-(h) (n=119); QIO(b)-(e), (g)-(h) (n=119); Q13(a)-(d) (n=117);
Q14(a)-(d) (n=1 14). These definitions are taken verbatim from Gluck & Bressman, Part 1,
supra note 19, at 930.
101. Q9(f) (n= 119); QI0(f) (n= 119); Q14(a)-(d).
102. Q14(e) (n=114).
103. Q9(a) (n= 119); Q0(a) (n= 119); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 69
(defining the "Ordinary-Meaning Canon" as dictating that "[w]ords are to be understood in
their ordinary, everyday meanings-unless the context indicates that they bear a technical
sense" (bolding omitted)).
104. Q 14(f) (n=1 14) ("Dictionaries should be used by interpreters in determining the
meaning of terms used in statutes (or rules).").
105. Q9(a)-(h) (n= 119); Q14(e) (n=1 14); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at
927 fig.1, 931 fig.3.
1023
STANFORD IAW REVIEW
veyed here reported that they knew each semantic canon by name than their
congressional counterparts in the Bressman and Gluck study. The varying level
of recognition by name, however, roughly corresponds between the two groups.
FIGURE 3
Knowledge of Semantic Canons by Name
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Figure 4 compares the agency rule drafters' use of the semantic canons
when asked by name versus when asked by concept, including two formula-
tions about the use of dictionaries.10 6 As Figure 4 illustrates, the rule drafters'
reported use of a particular canon varies greatly depending on whether they
were asked by name or by concept. The following Subparts address the key
takeaways from these findings, including how they compare descriptively to
106. Q10(a)-(h) (n= 119); Q13(a)-(d) (n= 117); QI4(a)-(e) (n= 114). The use of canons
by concept reports the percentage of drafters who answered that those concepts are "always"
or "often" used in drafting. The ordinary meaning canon was not asked by concept, and the
use of dictionaries was not asked by name but was asked in two different formulations.
Moreover, if the respondent indicated in Question 9 that she did not know the canon by
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the congressional respondents in the Bressman and Gluck study (and thus how
they may relate to interpreter fidelity). 10 7 These takeaways-like many of the
other findings in this Article-draw on the framework and taxonomy developed
in the Bressman and Gluck study.'0 8
FIGURE 4
Agency Drafters' Use of Semantic Canons
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107. As discussed in Part I.D, this comparison between the agency and congressional
respondents should be made carefully not only because of the methodological limitations in
both studies but also because the two drafting populations differ in substantial respects.
Similar to the Bressman and Gluck study, this survey also asked whether "it matteris] to
your rule drafting practices whether courts routinely rely on any of these rules," Q12
(n=l 19), and, by semantic canon, whether the rule drafter "believe[s] that courts rely on any
of these rules in interpreting legislation and/or regulations," QI I(a)-(h) (n=l 19). As to the
former, nearly four in five (78%) indicated that it did matter. As for the latter, the results
roughly correspond with the results for awareness and use of the canons by name. While
both sets of questions yielded a few interesting comments quoted elsewhere in the Article,
with hindsight, Question II in particular was probably not worth asking.
108. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 1016 tbl.3 (developing a ty-
pology of canon awareness and use),
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1. More familiarity by concept than by name (especially for canons
with Latin names)
It is not too surprising that the agency rule drafters surveyed generally were
more familiar with the semantic canons when asked by concept than by name,
particularly with respect to canons with Latin names. This finding is consistent
with that of the congressional respondents in the Bressman and Gluck study.10 9
In Reading Law, Scalia and Garner bemoaned lawyers' and judges' lack of fa-
miliarity with the semantic canons, relying on a quasi-experiment they con-
ducted at an American Bar Association (ABA) meeting to drive home this
point: "When your authors, as an experiment, asked a group of about 600 law-
yers how many knew the meaning of ejusdem generis (one of the oldest and
most frequently applied canons), only about 10 had sufficient confidence in the
answer to raise their hands."'10
Whereas the lack of familiarity with the canons no doubt continues, the fo-
cus on the names-especially the Latin names-seems misplaced. The com-
ments to this question reinforced that point. Of sixteen comments made, thir-
teen rule drafters criticized the survey for quizzing about Latin terms. One
representative comment, for instance, stated that "[i]t is a little silly to ask
about canons using [L]atin terms. More relevant would be to ask using English
translations."1 11 It seems like one of the 600 lawyers at the ABA event should
have responded along those lines. Indeed, as another rule drafter commented,
"Many of us have been instructed that the use of Latin phrases is discouraged,
thus, our continued knowledge of the foreign terms is limited." 12
Instead, the more important findings deal with which concepts are definite-
ly in use or robably in use, and which canons are known by name but rejected
in practice. 3 The following Subparts address these three sets of semantic can-
ons before turning to the ordinary meaning canon and the use of dictionaries.
2. Concepts definitely in use: whole act rule, consistent usage,
noscitur a sociis, and ejusdem generis
Although only about half of the rule drafters (55%) recognized it by name,
nearly nine in ten (89%) indicated that the assumption underlying the whole act
rule-that statutory terms are presumed to have a consistent meaning through-
out a statute-always or often applies. Only one rule drafter indicated that it
109. Id. at 930,
110. SCAItA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 7, 8 & n.17 (citation omitted). By compari-
son, 47% of rule drafters responded that they knew ejusdem generis by name. Q9(c).
111. Q9,cmt.1.
112. Id. cmt. 12.
113. It is thus no surprise that Bressman and Gluck similarly focused on two of these
three categories-concepts in use and canons known by name but rejected in practice-
though these canons do not perfectly align in both studies. See Gluck & Bressman, Part 1,
supra note 19, at 932-39.
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rarely applies, and none that it never applies. 14 Similarly, when framed in
terms of a consistent usage canon-that a term used in multiple places in the
same section of a statute is intended to mean the same thing within that see-
tion-93% of the rule drafters reported that this presumption is often or always
true.115 These findings are consistent with Reading Law's conclusion that
"[tihe correlative points of the presumption of consistent usage make intuitive
sense." 116 It may also be due in part to the Supreme Court's modern focus on
this canon. Part LA.4 returns to the whole act rule and consistent usage can-
on in light of related principles (the whole code rule and in pari materia) that
were known but rejected by the rule drafters.
The next most used semantic canons by concept are again related princi-
ples: noscitur a sociis-construe ambiguous terms in a list in reference to other
terms on the list-at 79%, and ejusden generis-construe general, often catch-
all, terms in a list in reference to other, more specific, terms in a list-at
60%. I This is despite the fact that these canons were two of the lesser known
by name, at 37% and 47%, respectively. 19 As discussed in Part II.A.1, the
likely reason for the lack of name recognition is due to the Latin names-
further suggesting that these canon ames should be translated into ordinary
English 120 This rationale finds further support by the stark disparity in the rule
drafters' reported use of the canons by concept versus by name: 79% versus
26% for noscitur a socils, and 60% versus 35% for ejusdem generis.12 1
The rule drafters' reported use of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis is
consistent with the Bressman and Gluck study. Most congressional respondents
did not know these canons by name-85% and 65%, respectively-but they
were the two most used semantic canons by general concept at 71%. 122
114. Q14(a) (n'114).
I 15. Q14(b) (n= 114). No one responded that it never applies; only one responded that it
rarely applies.
116. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 170.
117. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 937 ("In the October 2011 Term
of the Supreme Court alone, the whole act rule was used in at least three cases, and the lead-
ing case for the principle has been cited in at least 118 federal cases since 1995." (footnote
omitted)).
118. Q13(a), (d) (n= 117). These percentages include where the rule drafters indicated
that the assumptions were often or always true. Only one indicated never and none rarely for
noscitur a socils; and only three indicated never and three rarely for ejusdem generis.
119. Q9(b)-(c) (n= 119).
120. Indeed, when the author teaches these canons in his first-year legislation course, he
includes the Latin names but also refers to noscitur a sociis as the associated words canon
and ejusdem generis as the residual clause canon. Compare SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
84, at 195 (naming noscitur a sociis the "Associated-Words Canon" (bolding omitted)), with
id. at 199 (providing no English name for the "Ejusdem Generis Canon" (bolding omitted)).
121. QlO(b)-(c)(n=119);Q13(a),(d).
122. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 933.
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3. Concepts probably in use: expressio unius and superfluities
More than four in ten agency rule drafters reported that the concepts for
two additional semantic canons were often or always true expressio
uniuslinclusio unius-the inclusion of specific terms or exceptions indicates an
intent to exclude terms or exceptions not included-at 48%, and the rule
against superfluitics at 41%.123 These canons are placed in a "concepts proba-
bly in use" category because both were quite known by name (62% and 69%,
respectively 24) yet also less used by name (50% and 61%, respectively 2) and
by concept. This may suggest that there is less consensus about their use. In-
deed, one in ten rule drafters (9%) indicated they rarely use expressio unius by
concept (in addition to four respondents who said never); 21% reported that
they rarely used superfluities by concept (in addition to one respondent who
said never).12 6
Again, these findings are roughly consistent with the congressional draft-
ers' responses-though Bressman and Gluck classify expressio unius (at 33%)
among "concepts in use" and superfluities (at 31%) among "canons known, but
rejected."l27 They placed superfluities in the rejected category because 18% of
congressional respondents indicated that the concept rarely applies and 45%
said it sometimes applies.12 8 This is similar to the 22% of agency rule drafters
who indicated that it rarely or never applies, in addition to the 37% who said it
sometimes applies. The agency rule drafters surveyed likely reached the
same conclusion as Bressman and Gluck and their congressional respondents:
"[c]ommon sense tells us that, despite the popularity of this rule with judges,
there is likely to be redundancy, especially in exceedingly long statutes," and
that "even in short statutes-indeed, even within single sections of statutes
- . , , terms are often purposefully redundant to satisfy audiences other than
courts."3 0 The findings detailed in Part III concerning federal agencies' exten-
sive involvement in the legislative process arguably reinforce this conclusion.
In sum, expressio unius and superfluities seem to be somewhere in between
canons used and canons known but rejected in practice, though the degree in
between is roughly within the spectrum set forth in the Bressman and Gluck
study. In other words, if the congressional respondents there were representa-
tive of congressional wishes more generally, then the responses from the agen-
cy respondents here would seem to be faithful to those wishes. Conversely, if a
textualist judge grounded in the canons assessed fidelity, she would not be as
pleased with the agency rule drafters surveyed here, Both conclusions would
123. Q13(b)-(c) (n=1 17)
124. Q9(d)-(e) (n=l 19).
125. QI0(d)-(e) (n= 1l9).
126. Q13(b)-(c).
127, Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 932 & fig.4, 933-36.
128. Id. at 934.
129. Q13(c).
130. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 934-35 (footnote omitted).
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likely also be true for the known but rejected canons discussed in the following
Subpart.
4. Canons known by name, rejected in practice: whole code rule and
in par materia
Although the whole act rule (at 89%) and consistent usage canon (at 96%)
were reported as the most used by concept among the semantic canons,131 their
related canons-the whole code rule and in pari materia-were strongly reject-
ed in practice. Only one in four (25%) indicated they often or always use in
pari materia-similar statutory provisions should be interpreted similarly-in
agency statutory interpretation. 2 Even worse, only one rule drafter (<1%) in-
dicated use of the whole code rule. This is despite the fact that 50% and 59%
indicated they knew in pari materia and the whole code rule, respectively, by
name.134
The rule drafters provided more details on this rejection in the comments.
For instance, two rule drafters indicated they had "rarely seen courts invoke the
whole code rule in interpreting statutes." Based on personal experience, an-
other expressed little confidence in the legislative process:
Having seen how congress legislates-and knowing how much drafting is
done by basically know-nothing congressional staffers, I think it is basically
impossible to generalize about whether terms are intended to be used consist-
ently-most often the drafters, as well as their legislator bosses, have no clue
what is already in the statute that they are adding to or amending. I wish I
could be more positive, but have you read the shit that congress churns
out ... [?]136
And two rule drafters commented on how federal agencies are more careful and
precise than their congressional counterparts.13 7 The best way to reconcile their
embrace of the whole act rule and consistent usage canon yet rejection of the
whole code rule and in pari materia may be that the rule drafters surveyed are
more confident in the presumption of consistent usage in the same statute or
section of a statute than they are across statutes (much less the entire code).
131. Q14(a)-(b) (n=] 14).
132. Q14(c) (n=l 14).
133. Q14(d) (n=l 14).
134. Q9(f)-(g) (n=119).
135. QI 1, cmt. 1; accord id. cmt. 4 ("All are applied by at least some courts and judges,
but the whole code rule seems to be applied less frequently than the others.").
136. Q14, cmt. 4; see also Q15, cmt. 9 ("Congress is producing some pretty terrible
stuff to work with.").
137. Q14, cmt. 7 ("[W]e try to be consistent in drafting regulations, but it surely is clear
congress is not in drafting the statutes."); id. cmt. 13 ("It's not accurate to make the same
statement with regard to statutes and agency rules. Agencies are more precise and consistent
with drafting their regulations than Congress is with statutes.").
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The Bressman and Gluck congressional respondents similarly rejected the
whole code rule and in pari materia.138 But the congressional respondents also
"emphasized time and again the significant organizational barriers that the
committee system, bundled legislative deals, and lengthy, multidrafter statutes
pose to the realistic operation of' consistent usage principles.'3 9 Apparently,
the agency rule drafters surveyed have greater confidence in Congress's ability
to use words consistently within a statute or section of a statute than (at least)
the congressional drafters surveyed in the Bressman and Gluck study.
5. Ordinary meaning canon used, but perhaps not dictionaries
A clear winner in this study was the ordinary meaning canon, which in-
structs that "[w]ords are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday mean-
ings-unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense."i40 The or-
dinary meaning canon was the most known (at 92%) and the second most used
(at 87%) among the semantic canons in the study.14 1 That is not too surprising
as "[t]he ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of inter-
pretation"1 42 and has been a foundational rule since at least the 1800s.143
What perhaps is more surprising is that the agency rule drafters soundly re-
jected the use of dictionaries as a drafting tool. Only about one in five (19%)
indicated that dictionaries are often or always used in determining what terms
to use in statutes (or rules); only the whole code rule was used by fewer of the
rule drafters surveyed.144 This may be surprising, as a number of scholars have
noted that, "driven by the rise of the new textualism, the Supreme Court has in-
creasingly relied on dictionaries in discerning ordinary meaning."1 45 On the
138. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 933-34.
139. Id. at 936.
140. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 69 (bolding omitted).
141. Q9(a) (n=1 19); Q]0(a) (n-119).
142. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 69.
143. See, e.g., 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 432 (New York, 0.
Halsted 1826) ("The words of a statute are to be taken in their natural and ordinary significa-
tion and import; and if technical words are used, they are to be taken in a technical sense.");
I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 157 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) ("[Elvery word employed in the constitution is to be expounded
in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to con-
trol, qualify, or enlarge it.").
144. Ql4(d)-(e) (n=114).
145, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
252 (2000); accord MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 84, at 115 (citing Samuel A.
Thumma & Jeffery L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States
Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 252-60 (1999)); James J.
Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst for Dictionaries
in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 516-39 (2013) (presenting
empirical findings on dictionary use on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts). Indeed, Reading
Law includes a ten-page appendix on the proper use of dictionaries to derive ordinary mean-
ing. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 415-24.
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other hand, this finding is not too surprising in light of the Bressman and Gluck
study, which similarly found that the congressional respondents rejected the use
of dictionaries in legislative drafting. Indeed, more than half of the congres-
sional respondents reported that dictionaries are never or rarely used in draft-
ing.146 One congressional drafter colorfully explained that "Scalia is a bright
guy, but no one uses a freaking dictionary." 147
Because the Bressman and Gluck study only inquired into whether diction-
aries are used when drafting and not whether they "should be used by interpret-
ers in determining the meaning of terms used in statutes," this follow-up ques-
tion was added here.148 One rule drafter reflected the intuition behind this
addition: "A dictionary is helpful to understand intent, even if a dictionary was
not used by the drafters." 4 9 Indeed, it seems like many rule drafters agreed, as
double the number of rule drafters (39% from 19%) reported that dictionaries
are often or always used by interpreters in contrast to being used by drafters.15 0
This finding does not necessarily mean an interpreter is more faithful to con-
gressional wishes if she uses a dictionary, but it should make one even more
"curious about the distinct and unasked question [in the Bressman and Gluck
study about] whether congressional drafters think courts [or agencies] should
consult dictionaries to help discern the meaning of statutory terms,"1 5 1
B. The Substantive Canons
Substantive canons differ substantially from semantic canons. As Manning
and Stephenson have explained, substantive or normative canons "do not pur-
port to be neutral formalizations of background understandings about the way
people use and understand the English language. Instead, these substantive
canons ask interpreters to put a thumb on the scale in favor of some value or
policy that courts have identified as worthy of special protection."'
5 Put dif-
ferently, per Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, substantive canons "promote objec-
tives of the legal ystem which transcend the wishes of any particular session of
the legislature."
146. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 938.
147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Added another; "This question presumes
that legislative staff have dictionaries. I have tried to get an OED but people over at finance
say we aren't spending money to buy you a dictionary, And no Black's Law Dictionary ei-
ther." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Q14(f) (n= 114).
149, Id. cmt. 3.
150. Q14(c)-(f) (n= 114).
151. Christopher Walker, Does Congress Really Mean to Delegate Interpretative Au-
thority to Agencies?, JOTWELL (Aug. 16, 2013), http;//adlaw.jotwell.com/does-congress
-real ly-mean-to-delegate-interpretative-authority-to-agencies.
152. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 84, at 247.
153. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS




It has long been understood that substantive canons are not about empirical
realities of congressional drafting. This is a point Judge Henry Friendly made
long ago: "It does not seem in any way obvious, as a matter of interpretation,
that the legislature would prefer a narrow construction which does not raise
constitutional doubts to a broader one which does raise them."1 54 That under-
standing, however, has been called into question in recent years. Justice Ste-
phen Breyer, for instance, recently argued in dissent that "Congress would pre-
fer a less-than-optimal interpretation of its statute to the grave risk of a
constitutional holding that would set the statute entirely aside."Iss And, as dis-
cussed in this Part, the Bressman and Gluck study provides some support that
interpreter fidelity to congressional wishes may include adherence to at least
some of these substantive canons.
Although there are more than 100 substantive canons,156 this survey asked
the agency rule drafters nineteen questions about six substantive canons that
seemed most relevant to agency statutory interpretation (and tracked those
asked in the Bressman and Gluck study). Figure 5 presents the agency rule
drafters' responses as to their knowledge and use of the substantive canons by
name; unlike the semantic canons, to keep the survey under 200 questions,
these questions were not asked about knowledge or use by concept.15 7
With respect to substantive-canon awareness, the federalism canons-the
presumption against preemption of state law and the presumption against the
waiver of sovereign immunity-were the clear winners with 78% and 66% of
154. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 210 (1967).
155. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 566 (2009) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
156. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 940; see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Con-
stitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 598-629 (1992) (chronicling substantive can-
ons).
157. Q24(a)-(f) (n=99); Q25(a)-(f) (n=99). While the semantic and substantive canons
are discussed together in Part II of this Article, they were the second and fourth parts of the
survey, with the administrative law doctrines in between. This was a strategic decision made
due to the length of the online survey, the concern for incomplete answers, and a priority for
answers about the administrative law doctrines over the substantive canons. In light of the
responses regarding the substantive canons, this seems like a sound decision. With hindsight,
however, the final part of the survey on legislative history should have been moved before
the part on the substantive canons (and perhaps before the administrative law questions)-
although the number of responses only dropped by one between those final two parts.
Moreover, similar to the Bressman and Gluck study, this survey also asked whether "it
matter[s] to your rule drafting practices whether courts routinely rely on any of these rules,"
Q27 (n=98), and, by substantive canon, whether the rule drafter "believe[s] that courts rely
on any of these rules in interpreting legislation," Q26(a)-(g) (n=98). As to the former, 54%
of the rule drafters surveyed indicated that it did matter. As for the latter, the results roughly
correspond with the results for awareness of the substantive canons by name. With hindsight,
Q26 was probably not worth asking.
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agency rule drafters indicating they knew the canons by name.158 Constitution-
al avoidance was similarly well known at 62%,159 By contrast, the other three
substantive canons were not as well known: the presumption against an implied
right of action (at 44%); the presumption against extraterritoriality (at 42%);
and the rule of lenity (at 36%).16o The reported use of each substantive canon
was substantially lower with only the presumption against preemption above
40% (at 47%), followed by constitutional avoidance (at 28%) and the presump-
tion against the waiver of sovereign immunity (at 23%).161
FIGURE 5
Knowledge vs. Use of Substantive Canons
OFamiliarity EUse
Against Preemption 47%
Against Waiver of Immunity 23%66%
Constitutional Avoidance 62%
Against Implied Right of Action 44%
Against Extrateritoriality 42%
36%
Rule of Lenity 36%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Of these canons, by comparison, the congressional respondents in the
Bressman and Gluck study reported using constitutional avoidance at 25% (by
concept) and the rule of lenity at 14% (by name). Nearly four in five con-
158. Q24(c)-(d) (n=99); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 145, at 354-55 (classify-
ing the presumptions against prcemption and against the waiver of state sovereign immunity
as federalism canons); accord MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 84, at 267-68.
159. Q24(b) (n=99).
160, Q24(a), (e)-(f) (n=99).
161. Q25(b)-(d) (n=99).
162. Cluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 941 fig.5, 948. On the rule of lenity,
comparisons between the drafter populations would be unproductive as Bressman and Gluck
only asked congressional drafters who participated in drafting criminal legislation, whereas
this study asked all agency rule drafters. Moreover, based on the federal agencies in the sur-
vey population, see supra note 58, it is unlikely that many of the rule drafters surveyed have
had any on-the-job experience interpreting criminal statutes.
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
gressional respondents were familiar with either the federalism or preemption
canons-with half being familiar with both-and of those familiar with at least
one, 65% indicated they play a role in drafting decisions.163 And they found the
clear statement rules to be virtually irrelevant.)64 In other words, there is decent
evidence that some of these substantive canons are used in legislative drafting,
but whether that translates to an indicator of agency interpreter fidelity is less
clear. Indeed, at least one scholar (Mashaw) has suggested in the context of
constitutional avoidance that agency interpreters are arguably not in the same
position as judicial interpreters: "Obviously, administrators who fail to pursue
implementation any time a constitutional issue looms on their horizon could not
possibly carry out their legislative mandates effectively. Constitutionally timid
administration both compromises faithful agency and potentially usurps the
role of the judiciary in harmonizing congressional power and constitutional
command."t65
Because the substantive canons arguably do not reflect congressional wish-
es, Mashaw's observation may well apply to most or even all of them. But if
these canons do reflect interpreter fidelity-as Justice Breyer and some of the
congressional drafters surveyed have suggested-then the agency rule drafters'
modest familiarity with, but lack of use of, these substantive canons suggests
room for improvement. Perhaps the more important lesson here is that the ap-
plication of substantive canons to agency statutory interpretation and their place
within a faithful-agency interpretive framework are highly undertheorized and
even less understood empirically.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
This Part turns to the survey's thirty-five questions about the other main set
of tools of statutor interpretation -legislative history, which some refer to as
"extrinsic canons." As Bressman and Gluck have explained, like the canons,
there is an ongoing debate on the use of legislative history in statutory interpre-
tation, but the argument is different: "No one doubts that drafters are aware of
legislative history or that they write it. Instead, the divide is over the constitu-
tionality and effect on the legislative process of judicial reliance on legislative
history and also its reliability as evidence of statutory meaning,"1 6 7
163. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 942.
164. See id. at 94546.
165. Mashaw, supra note 17, at 508; see also Walker, supra note 21, at 140 (arguing
that modern constitutional avoidance should play no role when reviewing an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute it administers). But see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance
in the Executive Branch, 106 CoLUM. L. REv. 1189, 1196 (2006) (arguing for a more nu-
anced use of constitutional avoidance in the executive branch, including that "it should be
inapplicable in cases where the executive interpreter's knowledge of congressional intent
and statutory purpose removes the statute's ambiguity").
166, Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 924-25.
167. Id. at 965.
1034 [Vol. 67;999
May 2015] INSIDE AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
That debate will not be repeated here. Instead, the present question is what
role legislative history should play under a faithful-agency approach to agency
statutory interpretation. And what effect does or should the legislative process
have on agency statutory interpretation? Many would assert that the role of leg-
islative history should be the same regardless of whether an agency or judge is
the interpreter and whether legislative history is deemed to reveal congressional
intent or statutory meaning. Strauss and the congressional respondents in the
Bressman and Gluck study, however, would disagree.
Strauss argued nearly a quarter century ago that "[1]egislative history has a
centrality and importance for agency lawyers that might not readily be con-
ceived by persons who are outside government and are accustomed to consider-
ing its relevance only to actual or prospective judicial resolution of discrete
disputes."168 He went on to paint a vivid picture of legislative history's role in
agency statutory interpretation by depicting the law library of a federal agency:
Alongside the statutes for which the agency is responsible, you will find shelf
after shelf of their legislative history-collections that embrace not only print-
ed materials such as might make their way to a depositary library, but also
transcripts of relevant hearings, correspondence, and other informal traces of
the continuing interactions that go on between an agency and Capitol Hill as a
statute is being shaped in the legislative process, and perhaps afterwards in
[the] course of implementation.16
One of the important benefits of "[t]he enduring and multifaceted character
of the agency's relationship with Congress," he explained, is that the agency
has comparative expertise "to distinguish reliably those considerations that
served to shape the legislation, the legislative history wheat, from the more ma-
nipulative chaff."170 Although not advanced in faithful-agency terms, as
Mashaw has noted, Strauss's "basic case is that agencies have a direct relation-
ship with Congress that gives them insights into legislative purposes and mean-
ing .... For a faithful agent to forget this content, to in some sense ignore its
institutional memory, would be to divest itself of critical resources in carrying
out congressional designs."l71 It is perhaps for this reason that, as discussed in
Part LA, a number of scholars-in addition to Mashaw and Strauss-have
called for a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation (than
to judicial interpretation) based on comparative institutional expertise,
168. Strauss, supra note 22, at 329.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 347.
171. Mashaw, supra note 17, at 511 (discussing Strauss, supra note 22).
172. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 34, at 2085-87 (describing agencies' "interpretive
voicef" in comparative expertise terms), Eskridge, supra note 22, at 424 (arguing for more
purposivist agency statutory interpretation because, inter alia, "the administrators are proba-
bly more knowledgeable about the ongoing legislative history of the statute than judges
are"); see also Sunstein & Vermeue, supra note 22, at 928 (arguing that agencies can be
more purposivist "mostly because agencies have a superior degree of technical competence"
but also because "agencies are subject to a degree of democratic supervision").
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The Bressman and Gluck study painted a similar picture of Congress's re-
lationship with its bureaucratic agents. Over nine in ten congressional drafters
(94%) indicated that a purpose of legislative history is to shape the way agen-
cies interpret statutory ambiguities, with one in five (21%) volunteering that
legislative history also provides an oversight role for agency implementation of
a statute it administers.17 3 One congressional drafter provided a helpful exam-
ple: "We use everything from floor statements to letters to the agency-
members know how to communicate with agencies and make their policy pref-
erences known' . . . ." 174 Moreover, half of the congressional respondents
(53%) emphasized the importance of legislative history in the appropriations
context, as such legislative history specifies where the funds appropriated go
within the administrative state.17 5
Whereas Strauss has provided his personal insights into the agency's rela-
tionship with legislative history and the congressional drafters have presented
theirs, until now no study has attempted to uncover in any comprehensive man-
ner the empirical realities of how federal agencies use legislative history in
agency statutory interpretation. Part III.A presents the perspectives of the agen-
cy rule drafters surveyed on how their agencies participate in the legislative
process. Part III.B evaluates their views on the purposes of legislative history,
comparing descriptively the views of the agency rule drafters surveyed with
those of the congressional respondents in the Bressman and Gluck study. Final-
ly, Part III.C looks at the agency rule drafters' stances on the reliability of dif-
ferent types of legislative history, again comparing them with that of their pre-
viously surveyed congressional counterparts.
A. Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process
During the survey design phase, a number of agency officials suggested
that the survey ask about the rule drafters' participation in the legislative pro-
cess and, in particular, whether they worked on technical or substantive draft-
ing. Technical drafting, the agency officials explained, deals with reviewing
legislation to make sure it is textually and structurally coherent and consistent
with existing law. Substantive drafting, by contrast, involves shaping the actual
policy objectives of the proposed legislation." Other officials further suggest-
ed that the survey ask not only about the rule drafters' personal participation
but also about their agency's participation, as many general counsel offices
have separate staffs for regulation and legislative affairs. Figure 6 presents the
findings from these four questions.1 77
173. Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 768.
174. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 972.
175. Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 768,
176. Of course, whether the rule drafters understood these distinctions when responding
to the survey is a separate matter; no definition was provided in the survey instrument itself.
177. Q29(a)-(d) (n=98).
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As Figure 6 illustrates, the rule drafters reinforced Strauss's portrayal of
federal agencies' direct involvement in the legislative process. Nearly eight in
ten (78%) indicated that their agency always or often participates in a technical
drafting role for the statutes it administers (with another 15% indicating some-
times), and 59% reported that their agency always or often participates in a pol-
icy or substantive drafting role for the statutes the agency administers (with an-
other 27% indicating sometimes). It is not surprising that the numbers were
lower for personal participation: 29% always or often participate in technical
drafting with 29% more saying sometimes, and 18% always or often participate
in substantive drafting with 29% more saying sometimes.179 As indicated
above, many agency general counsel offices have separate regulation and legis-
lative affairs staffs, so the rule drafters surveyed here may not work often, if
ever, on the legislative affairs side. One comment is illustrative: "This survey
seems to assume that I have a role in both legislative and regulatory work-I do
not. I only work on the agency's regulatory actions and have no role in legisla-
tive work."' 80
The rule drafters were also asked if they personally or their agencies gener-
ally participate "in drafting legislative history (e.g., floor statements, committee
reports, conference reports, hearing testimony and questions, etc.)" of statutes
178. Q29(a), (c) (n=98).
179. Q29(b), (d) (n=98).
180. Id. cmt. 5.
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the agency administers.181 These questions were similarly added based on
feedback from agency officials during the survey design phase. One in four
(24%) indicated their agency always or often participates in legislative history
drafting with another 20% saying sometimes.182 Personal participation was
lower: only three rule drafters (3%) indicated they often participate, and none
always participate; one in five (21 %), however, indicated they sometimes par-
ticipate.183 Again, this disparity may be due in part to the separation of rule-
making and legislative functions within some agencies.
The rule drafters who commented on legislative history drafting provided
additional insights. One indicated that she "wouldn't think agencies would have
much of a public hand in this."184 Another thought it would be "strange" and
had "never known m agency to do this, but I'm not very involved in the legis-
lative work we do." A third similarly doubted whether the agency drafted
legislative history generally but noted some possibilities: "The agency would
never draft legislative history documents other than testimony and responses to
inquiries. However, it is possible that congressional staff could use Agency
produced documents in drafting documents on behalf of the committee."186
In sum, these findings, based on answers to just six questions, provide an
interesting yet limited window into the role of federal agencies in the legislative
process. According to the rule drafters surveyed, agencies play a significant
role in the technical and substantive drafting of statutes and even some role in
the creation of legislative history-though in many agencies different staffs
may do the legislative and regulatory work. As discussed further at the end of
Part 1II, this structural legislative-regulatory separation in many agency general
counsel offices merits deeper empirical inquiry.
B. Purposes of Legislative History
Regardless of the extent to which the structuring of an agency may separate
the legislative history experts from the rule drafters interpreting the statute, the
rule drafters surveyed still emphasized the importance of legislative history in
their statutory interpretation efforts. In particular, three in four (76%) agreed
that, in general, legislative history is a useful tool for interpreting statutes; an-
other 13% chose "other" (as opposed to the binary yes/no) to qualify their an-
swer as "sometimes" or "it depends."1 87
To put that number in perspective, of the twenty-two interpretive principles




184, Id. crnt. 2.
185. Id. cmt. 4.
186. Id. cmt. 3.
187. Q31 (n=98).
1038 [ Vol. 67:999
May 2015] INSIDE AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
sponse for use in interpretation. The only tools above it were Chevron defer-
ence (at 90%), the whole act rule (at 89%), the ordinary meaning canon (at
87%), the Mead doctrine (at 80%), and noscitur a sociis (at 79%). Contrast
that finding with the use of dictionaries as an interpretive tool, which came in at
39%. 189 By comparison, Bressman and Gluck found for their congressional re-
spondents that "legislative history scored above both the textual and substantive
canons, with roughly 70% of respondents stating that courts should use those
canons when determining congressional intent, compared to 92% favoring leg-
islative history."' 90
This question on legislative history also attracted the most comments-
from one in five respondents (21%).191 Many commenters attempted to qualify
the usefulness of legislative history. For instance, one remarked, "In general,
the legislative history can be a helpful tool to obtain insight into the purpose
and motivation for certain provisions when the legislative history is robust. But,
when the history is not as robust, it is not as useful a tool."192 Another echoed
this sentiment by explaining that "[ilt can be [useful] to the extent that Con-
gress actually explains what it is trying to achieve."193
Another rule drafter, by contrast, seemed to channel Justice Scalia but with
a pragmatic qualification: "It needs to be considered, because of the signifi-
cance it may have with courts. However, the only thing all the members of
Congress agreed upon was the words that actually made it into the statute." 94
In response to a different question about the reliability of legislative history,
however, another ule drafter expressly harkened to Justice Scalia but asserted
188. See supra Figure 2. Moreover, if the "other" answers (which appear to have meant
either "sometimes" or "it depends") are included, the reported use of legislative history
would rise to 89%, putting its use on par with Chevron, the whole act rule, and the ordinary
meaning canon, See Q31. In hindsight, this question would have been more effective if there
were not an option to select "other" instead of yes/no; or better yet, perhaps it should have
been styled like the by-concept questions in the semantic canons section, see Q13(a)-(d)
(n= 117); Q 14(a)-(f) (n=1 14), which provided the concept as a statement and then asked how
often (never, rarely, sometimes, often, or always) it was true. Note that for these canons re-
ported by concept, use is calculated by including those who responded that those concepts
were always or often true, excluding those who responded that they are sometimes true. For
this reason, the 76% number for legislative history use is used for comparison purposes.
189. Q14(f).
190. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 975.
191. Q31. Question 33, which asked about the reliability of various characteristics of
legislative history, also garnered twenty-one comments, constituting 21% of respondents.
Q33 (n=98). Although Question 8 received a greater number of comments at twenty-five, see
Q8 (n=126), it had a lower comments-to-respondents percentage (20%).
192, Q31, cmt. 21.
193. Id. cmt. 19.
194. Id. cmt. 9; cf. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are gov-
erned by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: 'The law as it
passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spo-




that legislative history may well be more helpful to an agency interpreter than a
judicial interpreter:
Although Justice Scalia would not be persuaded by any of these categories of
legislative history, they are sometimes the only source an agency has to dis-
cern legislative intent and apply its discretion in a way that is consistent with
legislative intent. In that regard, these types of legislative history can be more
valuable to an agency than they would be to a court.1 95
A number of rule drafters also commented on the decreasing usefulness of
legislative history. One explained that its usefulness "seems less so today, since
so much legislative history is in electronic e-mail format that is unpublished
and committee reports are less useful," 96 Another bemoaned the lack of "real
legislative history": "In many cases, the so-called legislative history just re-
states the statutory language in slightly different terms. That's not helpful. I
don't know why staffers bother with such non-substantive 'explanations."'
19 7
And yet another suggested the rise of the modern administrative state may have
caused the fall of legislative history:
Legislative history is sometimes useful, but it is becoming less so. Congress
puts less time into drafting legislative history that is useful to interpretation of
the statute and leaving more of that work to the agencies. The administrative
rulemaking process is taking on a larger role in shaping the rules that actually
apply to the country.t98
The agency rule drafters also addressed the purpose of legislative history-
being provided with the list used in the Bressman and Gluck study, which in-
cludes "the conventional judicial and scholarly assumptions" about purposes of
legislative history.199 Figure 7 presents these findings, descriptively comparing
them to those from the Bressman and Gluck congressional respondents.200
As in the Bressman and Gluck study, the conventional understanding-that
legislative history helps explain the purpose of the statute-was the purpose
most identified by the agency rule drafters (at 93%), with four in five (80%) al-
so seeing legislative history as important in explaining the meaning of particu-
lar statutory terms.201 In contrast to the congressional respondents, however,
the agency rule drafters did not seem to embrace as fully a number of other
main purposes. For instance, only 39% of agency rule drafters indicated that
legislative history is used to facilitate political "deals" that resulted in enacting
the statute, whereas 92% of congressional respondents so indicated.20 2 Similar-
195. Q32, cmt. 1.
196. Q31, cmt. 20.
197. Id. crnt. 15; accord Q30, cmt. 8 ("The value of legislative history has diminished
as the committee reports have tended to merely parrot the statutory text.").
198. Q31, cmt. 13.
199. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 970.
200. Q30(a)-(i) (n=98); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 971 fig.7.
201. Q30(a)-(b) (n=98); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 971 fig,7.
202. Q30(e) (n=98); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 972. This difference
in views on the importance of the "political deal" appears again when both groups were
asked about whether the reliability of a type of legislative history is affected by whether that
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ly, only 47% of rule drafters agreed that legislative history is intended to shape
the way the statute will apply to unforeseen future developments (compared to
78% of congressional respondents), and only 49% of rule drafters agreed that it
is intended to indicate a disagreement over the meaning of a particular term or
provision (compared to 77% of congressional respondents).203
FIGURE 7
Perceived Purposes of Legislative History
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With respect to its use as a guide for agency statutory interpretation, 65%
of rule drafters indicated that legislative history is intended to shape the way
statement/report was essential to the political deal that resulted in enacting the statute. Six in
ten congressional respondents (61%) reported that it did affect reliability, whereas only three
in ten agency rule drafters (32%) agreed. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 983
fig.9; Q33(f) (n=98).
203. Q30(c), (h) (n=98); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 971 fig.7.
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agencies will interpret deliberate ambiguities.204 This is lower than the 94% of
205
congressional respondents who so indicated. One explanation may be that
the higher percentage comes from the principal who delivers the message,
whereas the lower comes from the agent who is trying to make sense of that
message. One rule drafter's comment reflects this potential explanation: "[I]n
my experience, legislative history hasn't been particularly helpful in addressing
ambiguities.' 206
Similar to the congressional respondents (at 55%), only 54% of rule draft-
ers agreed that a purpose of legislative history was to indicate a decision to
leave a deliberate ambiguity in a statute.207 Resistance to the notion that legis-
lative history is used to signal deliberate ambiguity may have more to do with a
disagreement about (or at least distaste for) the idea that Congress deliberately
creates ambiguities, much less confesses to them in legislative history. One rule
drafter keyed in on this point in a comment to another question:
The idea that congressional drafters intentionally create ambiguities that they
expect agencies to interpret is often naive. In many cases there are ambiguities
because legislators can not agree on issues but can compromise by accepting
ambiguous language, Probably most often, ambiguities are the result of draft-
ers not anticipating issues that the language presents. The latter observation is
based on having drafted legislative as well as regulatory language.208
Although the rule drafters surveyed may have been less receptive to the
agency-specific purposes for legislative history than their congressional coun-
terparts, that should not distract from their overall embrace of legislative histo-
ry as a useful tool when engaging in agency statutory interpretation. Indeed,
76% indicated that legislative history is a useful tool, and over 80% agreed that
its objectives include explaining the purpose of the statute and the meaning of
particular terms in the statute. For interpreters, those uses of legislative history
are critical for resolving statutory ambiguities. One rule drafter nicely summed
up this takeaway: "Legislative history can help to clarify Congress's purpose in
enacting particular provisions, which in turn can help the Agency resolve am-
biguities in a way that is consistent with legislative intent."2 09
C. Reliability of Legislative History
In proposing a rules-based approach to using legislative history in statutory
interpretation that focuses on the time, place, and manner in which legislative
204. Q30(f) (n=98).
205. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 972.
206. Q31, cmt. 17.
207. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 971 fig.7; Q30(d) (n=98).
208. Q15, cmt. 1; accord id. cmt. 6 ("I don't think Congress generally intends to create
ambiguities or gaps .... ); id. cmt. 17 ("Maybe I'm cynical, but I don't always think con-
gressional drafters 'intend' these gaps. Often, they're just things they haven't thought
about.").
209. Q31, emt. 1.
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history was created, Nourse has observed that some law professors have
demonstrated "a stunning lack of knowledge about Congress's rules," resulting
in both their own and the average lawyer's ignorance about how to read the
congressional record and about how to use legislative history generally.210 One
would expect better from an agency rule drafter, who has extensive, daily expe-
rience in statutory interpretation and whose agency plays a substantial role in
the legislative process. To gauge their understanding, the rule drafters were
asked fifteen questions about the reliability of legislative history-almost all of
which were also asked verbatim to the congressional respondents in the Bress-
man and Gluck study.211
1. Reliability of types of legislative history
Figure 8 reports how the agency rule drafters ranked a variety of the most
common types of legislative history in terms of reliability.2 12 The order of the
reliability rankings is virtually identical to that of the congressional respondents
in the Bressman and Gluck study.m The agency rule drafters, however, gener-
ally indicated that each type of legislative history is less reliable than was indi-
cated by their congressional counterparts. For instance, 71% of congressional
drafters ranked conference reports as very reliable compared to 59% of agency
rule drafters; 69% to 37% for committee reports in support; 29% to 22% for
committee reports in opposition; 20% to 13% for hearing transcripts; and 12%
to 1% for floor statements by party leadership.2 14
210. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative His-
tory by the Rules, 122 YALE LJ. 70, 72-73 (2012).
211. Compare Q32(a) (n=92), Q32(b) (n=92), Q32(c) (n=87), Q32(d) (n=92), Q32(e)
(n=95), Q32(f) (n=91), Q32(g) (n=92), Q32(h) (n=92), and Q33(a)-(f) (n=98), with Gluck &
Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 977 fig.8, 983 fig.9. The rule drafters were asked to as-
sess the reliability of two additional sources: presidential signing statements and floor state-
ments made by the sponsor(s) of the statute. Q32(d); Q32(i) (n=86). Moreover, it should be
noted that four of the ten comments made on Question 32 questioned the use of the term "re-
liable," suggesting "useful" or "helpful" would have been a better term to use. See Q32,
cmts. 4, 7, 9-10.
212. Q32(a) (n=92); Q32(b) (n=92); Q32(c) (n=87); Q32(d) (n=92); Q32(e) (n=95);
Q32(f) (n=91); Q32(g) (n=92); Q32(h) (n=92); Q32(i) (n=86). Because these questions are
about the reliability of certain types of legislative history, the number of respondents consid-
ered for each of these questions and the percentage calculations for Figure 8 exclude those
respondents who indicated that they did not know the level of reliability.
213. See Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 977 fig.8; see also MANNING &
STEPHNSON, supra note 84, at 152 ("The conventional wisdom has been that the most relia-
ble form of legislative history consists of the reports prepared by the House and Senate
committees, which accompany bills favorably reported to the chamber, and the conference
committee reports which accompany the reconciled version of the House and Senate bills.").
214. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 977 fig.8; Q32(c) (n=87); Q32(e)
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The main takeaway is similar to that of the congressional respondents in
the Bressman and Gluck study: committee-produced legislative history is the
most reliable, though not per se reliable.2 15 This point was driven home by one
of the rule drafters: "Assuming a bill is debveloped [sic] in committee, that
committee's reports together with any conference committee report is the only
legislative history that I would give real significant weight."216 By ranking leg-
islative history materials that support the legislation above those that oppose it,
the agency rule drafters seem to have grasped (at least to some extent) Nourse's
fourth principle for reading legislative history: "[N]ever cite legislative history
without knowing who won and who lost the textual debate."2' 7 Similarly, by
ranking statements by party leadership as the least reliable on the list, they
seem to echo the Bressman and Gluck congressional respondents' feedback that
such statements are "nonexpert remarks by those having little to do with how
the legislation was put together."218
Finally, it is worth noting that presidential signing statements (14% very
reliable, 48% somewhat reliable) were ranked below the committee and confer-
215. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 976-78.
216. Q32, cmt. 8, accord id. cmt. 6 ("The most important documents are the bill and the
report accompanying it because that is what Congress votes on. Floor statements should not
be given as much weight. I review all of it, but place the greatest weight on the documents
that are actually used for the vote."); Q33, cet. 13 (stating that "unless it's a report, I
wouldn't be likely to consider using it").
217. Nourse, supra note 210, at 118-27 (capitalization altered),
218. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 979.
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ence reports but on par with floor statements by sponsors (8% very reliable,
57% somewhat reliable) and hearing transcripts (13% very reliable, 48%
somewhat reliable).219 The Bressman and Gluck study did not inquire into
presidential signing statements, but they seem more relevant in the agency con-
text. As noted in the Introduction, one complexity of principal-agent theory in
the administrative state is that the agent serves at least two principals: Congress
and the President.220 One rule drafter noted this potential significance:
"Pres[idential] signing statements may shape what agencies do, as reflective of
the policy choice of the administration, but I don't view them as true
leg[islative] history."22 1 Asking one question on presidential signing statements
does not even begin to help us understand the role of the President as another
principal in agency statutory interpretation; much more work needs to be
done.22
2. Factors that may affect reliability
The second set of questions on the reliability of legislative history inquired
into a half dozen of the factors judges and scholars have identified as important
in assessing the reliability of legislative history-the same factors and ques-
tions included in the Bressman and Gluck study. Figure 9 presents the findings
as to both drafter populations.223
As was true of their reliability rankings for the different types of legislative
history, the rule drafters' responses here generally tracked the congressional re-
spondents' responses in terms of the order of reliability or importance of the
factors. But the rule drafters surveyed also found each factor less likely to af-
fect reliability than their congressional counterparts. This disparity may be ex-
plained in part by the fact that one in four rule drafters (24%) indicated they did
not know if any of these factors affected reliability,224 By contrast, with respect
to the reliability of the nine types of legislative history discussed above and de-
219. Q32(d) (n=92); Q32(e) (n=95); Q32(f) (n=91); Q32(g) (n=92); Q32(h) (n=92);
Q32(i) (n=86).
220. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
221. Q32, cmt. 5; see also id. cmt. 4 (stating that these types of history "are not authori-
tative, in my opinion, other than the conference report & Pres[idential] signing statement").
222. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and Presidential
Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679 (2014) (exploring whether
presidential involvement in agency statutory interpretation should affect the level of defer-
ence a reviewing court owes to that interpretation); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Ad-
ministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001) ("Chevron's primary rationale suggests
a[n] - . . approach [that] would link deference in some way to presidential involvement-").
223. Q33(a)-(f) (n=98); Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 983 fig.9. Of the
98 rule drafters who responded to this question, 24 indicated they did not know. Q33(g)
(n=98). Because the question asks whether any of these factors "matter to [the rule drafter's]
assessment" of reliability of the legislative history, a response that the rule drafter does not
know for all practical purposes means that those factors do not matter to the drafter's as-




picted in Figure 8, only two types garnered "I don't know" responses above
5%: presidential signing statements at 11%, and floor statements by party lead-
ership at 9%. 225
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Many of the rule drafters surveyed appear to have understood (at least to
some extent) Nourse's second and third principles (later textual decisions trump
earlier ones, and the importance of proximity to the textual decision, respec-
tively) for reading legislative history, both of which deal with the timing of the
legislative history.22 The agency rule drafters surveyed identified the timing
concerns-"[h]ow close the statement/report was made prior to the day the leg-
islation passed" and "[w]hether the statement was made after the legislation
passed"-as the top two factors from this list of six that affect reliability.22 7
Again, these findings are consistent with those of their congressional counter-
parts in the Bressman and Gluck study.228 Also in line with the congressional
225. Q32(c) (n=87); Q32(i) (n=86).
226. See Nourse, supra note 210, at 98-117; see, e.g., Q33, cmt. 16 ("Statements after
the legislation is passed should not be given any weight. That is just one member's view.
Statements that are made significantly before legislation is passed should be given [little]
weight because legislation and views may change quickly over time,"),
227. Q33(c)-(d) (n=98).
228. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 984-85. The congressional drafters
ranked timing-closeness in time (before or after passage), and whether the statement was
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respondents, the agency rule drafters were least concerned from a reliability
perspective with whether the actual members of Congress had drafted the legis-
lative history or had even heard or read it.22 9
In sum, while the data here are limited and comparisons should be made
cautiously, the agency rule drafters surveyed seemed to rank reliability of legis-
lative history in roughly the same order as the Bressman and Gluck congres-
sional respondents. The biggest difference is that the rule drafters, on balance,
tended to consider legislative history less reliable than their congressional
counterparts. And as to various factors that could affect reliability, one in four
confessed to not knowing how to consider their effect.
The findings from these thirty-five questions on the use of legislative histo-
ry in agency statutory interpretation and the role of federal agencies in the leg-
islative process only scratch the surface of an area of administrative law that is
ripe for empirical investigation. From an agency interpretation perspective, for
example, the separation between legislative and regulatory functions within an
agency raises a number of questions that this study cannot answer, including
the following: Under an agency's typical structure, does the agency's legisla-
tive experience get incorporated into its rulemaking activities, such that the
Congress-agency relationship Strauss detailed actually extends to agency statu-
tory interpretation? Or do the legislative experts at the agency only get involved
once there is a threat of judicial challenge? Are there better ways to structure an
agency general counsel's office to make sure that interaction occurs?
One agency rule drafter volunteered an insightful observation in the some-
what analogous context of the interaction between an agency's rulemaking staff
and the government's litigators:
[Miost rule drafters and attorneys that practice admin law in the government
do not handle the litigation associated with rules. I think that is kicked to DOJ
[the U.S. Department of Justice], so I defin[itely] think there is a big discon-
nect between drafters and litigators/those who are defending the rule in court.
We often don't talk to each other until the rule is challenged. There is a lot we
can learn from the litigators, ways we can be more proactive in the rulemaking
rather than defensive after the fac[t].230
This comment also reflects this author's experience while working on the Jus-
tice Department's Civil Appellate Staff, which defends federal agencies and
their statutory interpretations in a variety of contexts.231 Once a regulation is
made after the legislation passed-as the most important and third most important factors,
respectively. See id. at 983 fig.9.
229. Q33(a)-(b) (n=98); Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 983 fig.9.
230. Q20,cmt.5.
231. See Al Daniel, The Role of DOJ's Appellate Staffs in the Supreme Court and in the




challenged in court, the government litigators marshal all federal agency re-
sources-the relevant agency rule drafters, the policy and legislative affairs
teams, the scientists and economists where applicable, and so forth-to defend
the regulation and provide the court with an accurate and detailed background
on the regulatory and statutory scheme. How many agencies encourage such
interaction prior to litigation and instead during the rule-drafting process, how-
ever, is an important question that merits further inquiry.
In light of the theoretical arguments that have been advanced about the dis-
tinct role legislative history (and purposivism more generally) should play in
agency statutory interpretation, there is a critical need for further empirical
work into the relationship between Congress and federal agencies in the legisla-
tive process as well as into the agency's internal use of legislative history in the
rulemaking process. Unlike many of the questions asked in this survey that
more directly implicate confidentiality or deliberative process privilege con-
cerns, agency general counsels may be more willing to entertain agency-
specific case studies on their agency's role in the legislative process. This
seems like a perfect research project to be pursued through the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS). 232
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINES
This fourth and final Part explores the rule drafters' familiarity with and
use of various administrative law doctrines in agency statutory interpretation. It
probably comes as no surprise that nearly half of the survey questions-97 of
195-dealt with administrative law. 233 This Article focuses on the findings
from these questions to explore various aspects of agency interpreter fidelity.
232. One note of caution: During the survey design phase, a predominant theme in in-
terviews with higher-level agency counsels was that agency general counsel offices vary
substantially in structure, practices, norms, and culture. Anyone who has worked at or stud-
ied federal agencies quickly realizes this. Yet little attention has been paid to these differ-
ences-an important exception being a terrific sourcebook published by the ACUS, which
explores the differences among federal agencies in general. See DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER
L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTivE AGENCIES (1st ed. 2012), available at
https://www.acus.gov/publication/sourcebook-united-states-executive-agencies. Indeed, an
empirical project focused just on mapping out those organizational and cultural differences
within agency general counsel's offices would be a meaningful contribution to the literature.
In all events, such diversity poses methodological challenges for generalizing findings across
the administrative state, but it also presents opportunities for drawing out best practices from
these various laboratories of bureaucracy.
233. See Q1 5-Q23, Q28. The Bressman and Gluck study, by contrast, included 45 ques-
tions on administrative law. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 992,
234. A number of the survey questions on administrative law explored the rule drafters'
views on how judicial behavior affects agency rule drafting as well as which interpretive
tools should apply at the various stages in the Chevron deference framework. Those findings
will not be presented in this Article. In total, the administrative law questions not discussed
(Q20-Q21; Q28) encompass 58 of the 97 questions on administrative law, though some of
the comments to those questions are incorporated. Seven of those questions (Q20(a)-(g)) are
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Part IV.A presents the rule drafters' responses as to their perceived relationship
to Congress. Part IV.B explores their views about what types of issues Con-
gress intends to delegate by ambiguity to federal agencies. Part IV.C explores
the agency rule drafters' knowledge and use of the key deference doctrines with
respect to judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.
A. Principal-Agent Interpretive Relationship
As discussed in Part LA, one of the most interesting findings from the
Bressman and Gluck study is that the congressional drafters surveyed perceived
Congress's primary interpretive relationship to be not with courts but with fed-
eral agencies. Indeed, as Bressman and Gluck have noted, the congressional
respondents "saw agencies as the everyday statutory interpreters, viewed inter-
pretive rules as tools for agencies, too, and made no distinction, as some schol-
ars have, between agency statutory 'implementation' and agency statutory 'in-
terpretation."'236 Accordingly, they conclude that "current theory and doctrine
are focusing on the wrong cues and the wrong relationships"-the wrong rela-
tionship being that between Congress and courts.237
Putting to one side the wrong cues, which Part IV.B addresses, it is not as
clear that modern administrative law doctrine is necessarily focused on the
wrong relationship. If anything, the Supreme Court's post-Chevron precedent
seems to expressly embrace the agency as the primary interpreter. And this
doctrine has developed in large part because of the separation of powers values
that undergird congressional delegation of interpretive authority to federal
agencies.2 18 Even the Court's framing of the Chevron rule defines the primacy
of the Congress-agency relationship in these terms: "Congress, when it left am-
biguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the
agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the
ambiguity allows."239 So does Chevron itself when holding that an agency's
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute controls even if it is not "the
the central focus of Walker, supra note 23, while the findings from the others (Q21; Q28)
will be explored in subsequent work.
235. Bressman & Gluck, Part II,supra note 19, at 767.
236. Id, at 765.
237. Id
238. The author has explored elsewhere these separation of powers values with respect
to the role of federal agencies as primary interpreters and implementers, and those points
will only briefly be discussed here. See Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The
Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV 221, 271-73 (2014); Walker, supra
note 21, at 173-82; Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial
Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1561-78 (2014); Walker, supra
note 50, at 78.
239. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996).
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reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a ju-
dicial proceeding."
240
Over the last decade the Court has deepened its commitment to this con-
cept that federal agencies-not courts-are the primary and authoritative inter-
preters of statutes Congress has entrusted them to administer. Three cases are
illustrative.
First, in 2005, the Court held that an agency's interpretation of an ambigu-
ous statute it administers trumps a court's prior interpretation of the statute.24 1
The Brand X Court explained that this conclusion necessarily follows from the
fact that the primary relationship in agency statutory interpretation is between
Congress and federal agencies, not between Congress and courts:
Since Chevron teaches that a court's opinion as to the best reading of an am-
biguous statute an agency is charged with administering is not authoritative,
the agency's decision to construe that statute differently from a court does not
say that the court's holding was legally wrong. Instead, the agency may, con-
sistent with the court's holding, choose a different construction, since the
agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason) of
such statutes.242
Second, the Court clarified in 2009 that the ordinary remand rule-that is,
if an error is found, a court generally should remand to the agency for addition-
al investigation or explanation as opposed to the court deciding the issue it-
self-applies even to questions of agency statutory interpretation,243 There, the
Negusie Court held that Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation was
inappropriate when the agency misread prior judicial precedent and erroneously
concluded that such precedent bound it. Instead of providing its own interpreta-
tion of the statute, however, the Court remanded to the agency to interpret the
statute in the first instance. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on
Brand X and its understanding that agencies are the primary interpreters: "This
remand rule exists, in part, because 'ambiguities in statutes within an agency's
jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the
statutory gap in reasonable fashion."'
244
Finally, in 2013, the Court held in City of Arlington v. FCC that Chevron
deference applies even to an agency's interpretation that defines "the scope of
its regulatory authority (that is, its jurisdiction)."2 4 5 In reaching this conclusion
the Court reiterated its understanding of the primary principal-agent interpre-
240. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res, Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11
(1984).
241. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83
(2005) ("Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the
agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a con-
flicting agency construction."); see also Walker, supra note 21, at 170-71.
242. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983.
243. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009). See generally Walker, supra note
238, at 1561-78 (tracing the evolution of the ordinary remand rule).
244. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523 (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980).
245. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866, 1874-75 (2013).
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tive relationship: "Statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering agency.
Congress knows to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in
capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion."24 6 In sum, while
there are dissents from and disagreements about the holdings in these cases, it
seems fair to conclude that the Court's post-Chevron doctrine has focused on
the right relationship-that between Congress and federal agencies.
Whereas the Court and the congressional drafters surveyed have prioritized
the court-agency relationship as primary in agency statutory interpretation, until
now we had little insight into whether federal agency rule drafters perceive
their role-and their organization's relationship with Congress-in a similar
light. To attempt to understand the rule drafters' perspectives on these issues,
the survey asked them about these cases by name and concept. This Part focus-
es on the concepts, whereas Part IV.C focuses on the cases by name.
First and foremost, the rule drafters surveyed generally agreed with the
bedrock Chevron principle that federal agencies, not courts, are the primary in-
terpreters of statutes Congress has charged them to administer. Without refer-
ring to Chevron by name, the rule drafters were asked whether they agreed with
the following statement: "If a statute is ambiguous and the agency's construc-
tion is reasonable, a court must accept the agency's construction of the statute,
even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best
statutory interpretation."247 Eight in ten rule drafters (85%) indicated that they
either strongly agreed (45%) or agreed (40%), and another one in ten (10%)
agreed somewhat. Only 5% disagreed, with one rule drafter indicating strong
disagreement.248 No doubt the following comment reflected the latter's per-
spective: "'[A] court MUST ACCEPT the agency's interpretation'? Uh, no.
Maybe they should, but after all, it is courts that review agency interpretations
and not the other way around."249 But in general, the rule drafters surveyed
246. Id. at 1868 (citation omitted).
247. Q16(b) (n=107).
248. Id. Because Question 16 asks about the rule drafters' agreement with particular
statements, those who indicated they did not know, as well as those who marked "other:' are
not included in the number of respondents or the percentage calculations. Moreover, this
question was not included in the Bressman and Gluck study. Instead, they used the following
deference-related statement: "The principles related to how much deference courts will ac-
cord federal agency decisions allow congressional drafters to leave statutory terms ambigu-
ous because the agency can later specify those terms." Methods Appendix, supra note 62, at
27, This survey similarly asked that question, but the rule drafters did not agree as strongly
with this statement as with Question 16(b): 17% strongly agreed, 42% agreed, 29% some-
what agreed, 10% disagreed, and 2% strongly disagreed. Q16(a) (n=103). This study focuses
on Question 16(b) instead of Question 16(a) because the statement presented in Question
16(b) better reflects the Chevron doctrine.
249. Q16, cmt. 3. Moreover, one respondent remarked that "[the answers to these ques-
tions vary circuit by circuit." Id. cmt, 9. And another noted, "It depends on how reasonable
the agency's interpretation was. Just because a statute is ambiguous doesn't mean an agency
can pick the nuttiest interpretation out there." Id. cmt. 10.
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seemed to embrace the idea that federal agencies are the primary partners of
Congress in agency statutory interpretation.
When asked about the Brand X principle, the agency rule drafters surveyed
were not quite as bullish. Without referring to Brand X by name, the rule draft-
ers were asked whether they agreed with the following statement: "A court's
opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an agency is charged
with administering is not authoritative; instead, the agency may choose a dif-
ferent construction so long as it is reasonable."250 Again, a strong majority
(65%) either agreed (39%) or strongly agreed (25%), and another 10% agreed
somewhat. But one in four (26%) disagreed (21%) or strongly disagreed
(5%).251 In other words, not only were there fewer who agreed strongly (25%
to 45%), but five times as many who disagreed (26% to 5%),
Accordingly, it seems that, while the rule drafters viewed federal agencies
as the primary interpreters of statutes they administer, they were also more sen-
sitive to the importance of courts than were the Bressman and Gluck congres-
sional respondents. The overwhelming majority of rule drafters surveyed rec-
ognized that judicial review plays a role in their interpretive efforts and that
judicial views on the various interpretive tools influence their rule-drafting pro-
cess. For instance, nearly four in five rule drafters indicated that it matters to
their rule-drafting practices whether courts routinely rely on the canons.252 Per-
haps there are more rule drafters who would agree with Justice Scalia's dissent
in Brand X- in particular, that it is "not only bizarre" but "probably unconstitu-
tional" to make "judicial decisions subject to reversal by executive officers."2 53
In all events, the findings uncovered here only start the conversation on how
federal agencies view their role in the modem administrative state in relation to
Congress and the courts. Much more work needs to be done.254
250. Q16(c) (n=102).
251. Id. One rule drafter commented that whether an agency may choose a different
construction "depends on the circumstances. A court's interpretation could make it difficult
to have a different interpretation," Id. cmt, 2.
252. Q12 (n= 119).
253. Nat'] Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1016-
17 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. The rule drafters were also asked about whether they were familiar by name with
Brand X, the ordinary remand rule, and a third government litigation concept (governmental
intercircuit nonacquiescence) and whether those principles played a role in their rule draft-
ing. A short description was included along with the name of the case/principle. See Q22-
Q23. With respect to Brand X, 43% of rule drafters indicated that they were familiar with the
principle and 29% indicated that it played a role in drafting. Q22(a) (n=99); Q23(a) (n=99).
The findings were similar for the ordinary remand rule-45% familiar, 21% used in draft-
ing-and for governmental intercircuit nonacquiescence-57% familiar, 25% used. Q22(b)-
(c); Q23(b)-(c). The findings with respect to these questions are explored more fully in
Walker, supra note 19, at 726, 727 & fig.4, 728.
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B. Scope of Lawmaking Delegation
Although there seems to be an understanding among the Supreme Court,
Congress, and the rule drafters surveyed that federal agencies are the primary
interpreters of ambiguous statutes Congress has charged them to administer,
not everyone agrees about the scope of that interpretive authority. As the con-
gressional respondents in the Bressman and Gluck study made clear, not every
type of ambiguity left in a statute is intended to delegate lawmaking authority
to federal agencies.2 55 This finding no doubt is at least part of the conclusion
Bressman and Gluck reach that "current theory and doctrine are focusing on the
wrong cues."256
FIGURE 10
Types of Statutory Gaps or Ambiguities
Congress Intends for Federal Agencies to Fill
OAgency Rule Drafters *Congresaionat Drafters
99%
Agency's Area uf Expertise 92%
93%
Scope ofAgency's Jurisdiction 75%
Omissions in Statules 72%72%
Federal-State Agencies Labor Diviaon 6570%
Major Policy Quesions 29% 56%
Major Economic Questions 49%
Preemption of Stair ew 3La
Major Political Questions 3%
Serious Constitutional Questioms 24%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
255. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1003-04, 1005 & figl 1, 1006.
256. Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 765. See generally Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REv. 2009,
2025-34 (2011) (reviewing literature and showing consensus that the primary justification
for Chevron is a legal fiction and not that Congress intends to delegate lawmaking authority
each and every time there is an ambiguity in a statute an agency administers).
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To assess the rule drafters' understanding about which ambiguities signal
delegation, the survey asked about the same eight types of ambiguities covered
in the Bressman and Gluck study and added two more: ambiguities relating to
the agency's own jurisdiction or regulatory authority and those implicating se-
rious constitutional questions. Figure 10 presents the findings as to both the
agency rule drafter and congressional drafter populations.257
All ten of these types of ambiguity relate to the ongoing judicial and schol-
arly debate about the scope of lawmaking delegation that is often termed the
Chevron "Step Zero" inquiry.25 8 The survey findings on these ten questions can
be grouped into three main observations.
1. Consensus delegation: implementation details, agency expertise,
omissions in statutes, and federal-state agencies' labor division
With respect to the gaps or ambiguities that most congressional respond-
ents indicated federal agencies should fill, there was remarkable agreement
among the rule drafters surveyed here. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the top vote-
getter in both populations was ambiguities relating to the details of implemen-
tation, with 99% of both populations agreeing that Congress intends for agen-
cies to fill such gaps.2 59 The one rule drafter to dissent chose "[n]one of the
above," indicating that Congress does not intend for agencies to fill any of the
types of ambiguities listed.260 Most agency rule drafters and congressional
drafters also agreed that Congress intends to delegate ambiguities relating to
the agency's area of expertise (92% and 93%, respectively); relating to omis-
sions in the statute (72% for both); and relating to the division between state
and federal agencies when both are given implementation roles (65% and 70%,
respectively). 261
From a faithful-agency perspective, it seems the agency rule drafters sur-
veyed understood that their main lawmaking role involved filling in the imple-
mentation details in statutes, resolving ambiguities where the federal agency
257. Q15(a)-(j) (n=l 11); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1005 fig.11. Two
respondents indicated that they did not know, so the number of respondents considered and
the percentage calculations in Figure 10 do not include those responses. Another rule drafter
indicated none of the above, so that response is included,
258. Tom Merrill and Kristin Hickman coined this term shortly after the Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Merrill & Hickman, supra note
21, at 836-37; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207-11
(2006). See generally Shane & Walker, supra note 24, at 477-84 (reviewing literature on the
Chevron Step Zero debate).
259. Q15(a) (n=1 11); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1004, 1005 fig.I I -
260, Q15(k). Of the eighteen comments, five expressed concern that he question could
not be answered in a general matter but rather depended on the particular statute. See QIS,
cmts. 3-4, 6, 11, 13. Another criticized the question because it "indulges the unsupportable
fiction that congressional drafters have a unified approach on these things. They don't." Id.
cmt. 5.
261. Q I5(h)-(j); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1004, 1005 fig.1 1.
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actually has expertise, and filling in the statutory holes or omissions. Those
delegated roles seem like the predominant ones even if the congressional draft-
ers surveyed in the Bressman and Gluck study (who wholeheartedly agreed)
were not representative of Congress as a whole.26 2 Similarly, it seems reasona-
ble to conclude, as the majority of both the agency rule drafters and congres-
sional drafters surveyed id, that when Congress does not specify that a state
agency should take the lead, Congress intends for the federal agency to make
that determination (as opposed to, for instance, a court or state agency).
2. Both less sure: major questions and preemption
Like the Bressman and Gluck congressional respondents, the agency rule
drafters here were less confident and more conflicted about whether Congress
intends to delegate major policy questions by ambiguity. This is an important
issue in administrative law, as the Supreme Court has carved out an exception
to the Chevron presumption of delegation. Bressman and Gluck nicely frame
this major questions doctrine as "a presumption of nondelegation in the face of
statutory ambiguity over major policy questions or questions of major political
or economic significance."263 This doctrine exists, as Justice Scalia has fa-
mously observed, because it is presumed that Congress "does not .. .hide ele-
phants in mouscholes."264
Both studies approached this question about the major questions doctrine
by asking it in three different ways, with the results as follows:
* Ambiguities/gaps relating to major policy questions: 56% agency rule
drafters, 28% congressional drafters;
* Ambiguities/gaps implicating questions of major economic significance:
49% agency rule drafters, 38% congressional drafters; and
* Ambiguities/gaps implicating questions of major political significance:
32% agency rule drafters, 33% congressional drafters.265
In other words, like the congressional respondents, far fewer agency rule draft-
ers believed that Congress intends to delegate ambiguities implicating major
questions than the ambiguities discussed in Part IV.B.1 about implementation
details and agency expertise. But twice as many agency than congressional re-
spondents (56% to 28%) believed that Congress intends to delegate ambiguities
relating to major policy questions.
262. See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2008)
(noting that core justifications for Chevron deference include "(1) congressionally delegated
authority, (2) agency expertise, (3) political responsiveness and accountability, (4) delibera-
tive rationality, and (5) national uniformity").
263. Gluck & Bressman, Part l, supra note 19, at 1003.
264. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 US. 457, 468 (2001). There is a robust
scholarly discussion on this doctrine that need not be repeated here. See, e.g., Jacob Loshin
& Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REv. 19 (2010) (re-
viewing literature and providing a summary of doctrinal development).
265. Q15(b)-(d) (n=1 11); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1003.
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Based on the comments made by various drafters surveyed in Congress and
the federal agencies, one can construct an informative exchange between Con-
gress and a federal agency regarding whether Congress intends to delegate by
ambiguity-or actually does delegate-major questions to federal agencies.
Consider the following dialogue, pieced together with some artistic license but
with the actual comments in quotation marks:
Agency: "Generally major policy, economic, or political deci-
sions should be made by congress unless congress
has delegated to the agency on the basis of the agen-
cy's expertise."266
Congress: Completely agree. "[Delegating major questions],
never! [We] keep all those to [our]selves."267
Agency: But "[slometimes issues of substantial political im-
port are left to agencies . . . "
Congress: Well, "[w]e try not to leave major policy questions to
an agency . . .. [They] should be resolved here,"269
Agency: Trying is different than succeeding. "While members
of Congress and their staff would likely answer these
questions [about delegating major questions] very
differently, the reality is that Congress often leaves
unanswered decisions to the implementing agency,
not because they trust the agency, but in order to
achieve the necessary consensus to move a bill." 270
Congress: Fair enough. "Sometimes because of controversy, we
can't say what to include-either complexity or con-
troversy."271
Agency: Agreed. In other words, "Congress should make the
major policy decisions in a statute, but can leave de-
tails of precise implementation to agency regulations.
However, Congress sometimes passes laws that leave
broad areas to agency discretion in order to achieve a
political compromise."272
266. Q15,cmt.7.
267. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 1004 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
268. Q15, cmt. 2.
269. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1004 (second and third alterations in
original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Q1S, cmt. 16 (emphasis added).
271. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1004 n.395 (emphasis added) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
272. Q15, cmt. 14.
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Congress: Yes, "sometimes [we] have to punt."273
Agency: No, "Congress often punts on difficult political ques-
tions."274
Congress: Okay, it happens "[wJhen we can't reach agree-
ment."275
Agency: "I think [not delegating major questions to agencies]
is what Congress thinks it is doing, but in reality, I
think agencies are often left to decide almost all of
these-and I think Congress doesn't understand the
types of ambiguities it leaves when it drafts legisla-
tion. Congress is producing some pretty terrible stuff
to work with."276
Indeed, this dialogue may help explain why the agency rule drafters surveyed
were more willing to accept that Congress intends to delegate major policy
questions by ambiguity to federal agencies.
The results were similar with respect to ambiguities or gaps relating to the
preemption of state law: 46% of agency rule drafters agreed that Congress in-
tends to delegate by ambi uity on these questions, compared to 36% of the
congressional respondents.P? As Bressman and Gluck have noted, this sub-
stantial, but not overwhelming, response from both drafter populations is simi-
lar to the divide in the scholarly debate and may be due in part to the Supreme
Court's failure to date to provide more clarity.278
3. At least agencies think so: yes, for scope of agency's jurisdiction;
no, for serious constitutional questions
With respect to the two questions asked only of the agency rule drafters
(and not of the congressional drafters), the rule drafters had very different reac-
tions. Only one in four rule drafters (24%) believed that Congress intends for
federal agencies to fill gaps or ambiguities implicating serious constitutional
questions.279 That was the clear loser for this question. The three next lowest
responses concern the major questions doctrine discussed in Part IV.B: major
political questions (at 32%), preemption of state law (at 46%), major economic
questions (at 49%), and major policy questions (at 56%).280 These findings
273. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1004 n.395 (emphasis added) (inter-
nal quotation mark omitted).
274. Q15, cmt. 18 (emphasis added).
275. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 1004 n.395 (alteration in original) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
276. Q15,cmt.9.
277. Q15(g) (n= Il l); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1005 fig.1 1.
278. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 1004 & nn.396-97.
279. Q15(e) (n=111).
280. Ql5(b)-(d), (g) (n=111).
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about whether agencies are delegated authority to resolve major questions, con-
stitutional questions, or preemption issues may shed light on the current debates
among scholars, judges, and policymakers about whether such substantive can-
ons should trump Chevron deference.28 1
By contrast, three in four rule drafters (75%) indicated that Congress in-
tends for federal agencies to fill gaps or ambiguities relating to the agency's
own jurisdiction or regulatory authority.2 Only ambiguities about implemen-
tation details (at 99%) and those relating to the agency's area of expertise (at
92%) received more responses from the rule drafters.8 3 And in another ques-
tion asking about which factors affect whether Chevron deference applies,
nearly half (46%) indicated that it matters "[w]hether the agency's statutory in-
terpretation sets forth the bounds of the agency's jurisdiction or regulatory au-
thority." 284 That question, however, did not ask in what way such a factor
would matter.
At first blush, it may be puzzling that 75% of rule drafters believed that
Congress intends to delegate such questions by ambiguity. After all,
"[jjurisdictional questions often overlap with or are indistinguishable from 'ma-
jor questions,"' such that Bressman and Gluck "suspect[ed] that [their congres-
sional drafterJ respondents would emphasize the obligation of Congress, not
agencies, to resolve such questions." There are at least two probable expla-
nations for this apparent inconsistency. First, this survey went live after the
Court decided City of Arlington v. FCC, discussed in Part IV.A, which held that
"an agency's interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of
its regulatory authority (that is, its jurisdiction) is entitled to [Chevron] defer-
ence."286 Many rule drafters surveyed probably knew of that definitive prece-
dent. Second, and more fundamentally, this question about the scope of an
agency's authority to decide its own authority was asked not of congressional
drafters but of agency rule drafters. After all, an agent may be naturally in-
clined to view her role in defining her authority more broadly than would the
principal.
281. Compare Sunstein, supra note 21, at 330-35 (arguing that certain nondelegation
canons-including constitutional avoidance, the presumption against preemption, and the
major questions doctrine-should trump Chevron deference), with Walker, supra note 21, at
140 (arguing against the conventional view that the modem constitutional avoidance doc-
trine trumps Chevron deference), and Bamberger, supra note 21, at 111, 114 (arguing that
substantive canons should apply at Chevron Step Two).
282. Ql5(f) (n=111).
283. Q15(a), (j) (n=1 I)
284. Ql9(c) (n=109). Part IV.C.3 below further addresses these findings.
285. Gluck & Bressinan, Part 1, supra note 19, at 1005-06; accord Walker, supra note
151 ("The survey did not ask whether [congressional] drafters intend to delegate by ambigui-
ty authority for agencies to determine the scope of their own statutory jurisdiction-the
question City of Arlington answered in the affirmative.").
286. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866, 1868-69 (2013).
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C. The Judicial Deference Doctrines
This final Part turns to the rule drafters' awareness of the foundational def-
erence doctrines for judicial review of administrative interpretations of law-
Chevron, Mead, Skidmore, and Auer/Seminole Rock-as well as whether the
doctrines play a role in their drafting decisions.
Administrative law recognizes two main deference doctrines relating to
agency statutory interpretation: Chevron and Skidmore. The first is the familiar
Chevron two-step approach, under which a reviewing court defers to an agen-
cy's interpretation of a statute it administers if, at step one, the court finds "the
statute is silent or ambiguous" and then, at step two, determines that the agen-
cy's reading is a "permissible construction of the statute,"287 "The court need
not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted - . . or even the reading the court would have reached if the ques-
tion initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."2 88 The second is Skidmore,
under which an agency's interpretation does not control so long as it is reason-
able but, instead, is given "weight" based on "the thoroughness evident in [the
agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earli-
er and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to per-
suade."289
Strauss has helpfully reframed these doctrines as "Chevron space" and
"Skidmore weight."290 An agency receives Chevron space to fill in holes in
statutes it administers because Congress empowered the agency to be "the au-
thoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes."291 Or, as
Strauss puts it, "the natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports match,
is to see that the ball stays within the bounds of the playing field and that the
game is played according to its rules. It is not for courts themselves to play the
game."292 Skidmore weight, by contrast, "addresses the possibility that an
agency's view on a given statutory question may in itself warrant respect by
judges who themselves have ultimate interpretive authority" even when Chev-
ron space does not apply.29 3 Under Skidmore, the agency retains the power to
persuade based on its special knowledge and experience that may qualify it as
an expert on statutory meaning and purpose. Among other sources of agency
287. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
288. Id. at 843 n.11.
289. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
290. Strauss, supra note 50, at 1144-45; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that Chevron "create[s] a space, so to
speak, for the exercise of continuing agency discretion"); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (de-
scribing the standard as "weight" based on "power to persuade").
291. Nat'l Cabte & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983
(2005).




expertise, agencies often have nationwide experience in implementing the stat-
ute and may well have assisted in the drafting of the statute. 94
It is important to note that the lack of Chevron space may occur in one of
two ways: Congress has not delegated interpretive authority to the agency; or
Congress has delegated it, but the agency has "cho[sen] not to exercise that au-
thority, but rather to guide-to indicate desired directions without undertaking
(as [it] might) to compel them."2 95 This was the basic takeaway from Mead:
"[A] very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudi-
cation that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed."29 6
The Mead Court also noted that it had "sometimes found reasons for Chevron
deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none
was afforded."297 Finally, the Mead Court explained that Skidmore weight ap-
plies when Chevron space does not.298
A final judicial review doctrine evaluated in the survey is Auer or Seminole
Rock deference, which deals with reviewing an agency's interpretation of its
own regulations.299 This doctrine instructs courts that an agency's interpreta-
tion of its own regulation is given "controlling weight unless it is plainly erro-
neous or inconsistent with the regulation."300 Scholars,30 1 joined by Justice
Scalia302 and more recently this Term by Justices Thomas and Alito, 3 03 have
called for the Court to revisit this doctrine.
294. See id. at 1146 ("It is not only that agencies have the credibility of their circum-
stances, but also that they can contribute to an efficient, predictable, and nationally uniform
understanding of the law that would be disrupted by the variable results to be expected from
a geographically and politically diverse judiciary encountering the hardest . . . issues with
little experience with the overall scheme and its patterns."); supra Part IllA (presenting
findings on the role of federal agencies in the legislative process).
295. Strauss, supra note 45, at 1146.
296. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
297. Id. at 231.
298. Id. at 234-38 (reviewing Skidmore factors). See generally Jud Mathews, Deference
Lotteries, 91 TEx. L, REV. 1349, 1356-76 (2013) (elaborating on Chevron, Skidmore, and
Mead, providing a literature review, and explaining that the vagueness of the Mead standard
means that the application of either Chevron or Skidmore deference will ultimately depend
on the random assignment of circuit judges); Walker, supra note 50 (responding to Mathews,
supra).
299. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410 (1945),
300. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414; accord Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
301. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 38, at 617 (arguing that "the Court should replace
Seminole Rock with a standard that imposes an independent judicial check on the agency's
determination of regulatory meaning"),
302. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("For decades, and for no good reason, we have been giv-
ing agencies the authority to say what their rules mean...."); accord Talk Am., Inc. v.
Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265-66 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
303. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1225 (2015) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) ("By my best lights, the entire line of precedent beginning with Semi-
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The rule drafters' responses with respect to these administrative law doc-
trines can be grouped into three main findings.304
1. Chevron most known and used by name, followed by Skidmore
then Mead
The agency rule drafters were asked whether they were familiar, by name,
with these "interpretive doctrines related to how much deference courts will ac-
cord federal agency decisions" as well as whether "these doctrines play a role
in [their] rule drafting decisions."30 5 Figure 11 depicts the agency rule drafters'
responses to these questions. 306
FIGURE I I
Awareness and Use of Deference Doctrines
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nole Rock raises serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered in an appropri-
ate case."); accord id. at 1210 (Alito, L, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("The opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas offer substantial reasons why the Semi-
nole Rock doctrine may be incorrect.").
304. The agency rule drafters were also asked about Curtiss-Wright deference, which is
a "super-strong deference to executive department interpretations in matters of foreign af-
fairs and national security." Eskridge & Baer, supra note 42, at I100; see United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (holding that legislation dealing with
matters "within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discre-
tion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic
affairs alone involved"). Only 6% of rule drafters indicated any awareness of this doctrine by
name with 2% indicating they had used it in interpretation. Q17(e) (n=109); Q18(e) (n=109).
305. Q17-Ql8.
306. Q17(a)-(d) (n=109); Q18(a)-(d) (n=109).
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As Figure 11 illustrates, 94% of the rule drafters knew Chevron deference
by name, followed by 81% for Skidmore, 61% for Mead, and 53% for Seminole
Rock/Auer. 307 Two rule drafters were familiar with certain doctrines by name,
but would have to "look them up to remember the details."308 At 94%, Chevron
was the most known among the rule drafters surveyed of all the interpretive
tools covered by name in the survey. In the Bressman and Gluck study, Chev-
ron deference was also the big winner in the name recognition game with
awareness by 82% of congressional respondents.309 Skidmore (at 39%) and
Mead (at 28%), however, were far less known among congressional respond-
ents than among the rule drafters surveyed here.3 10 This should not be too sur-
prising; agency rule drafters, after all, are (hopefully) thinking about adminis-
trative law doctrines on a much more regular basis than their congressional
counterparts.
With respect to the role of these doctrines in drafting decisions, the agency
rule drafters' reported use of these doctrines follows the same pattern, with
varying levels of less reported use than familiarity: Chevron at 90%, Skidmore
at 62%, Mead at 49%, and Seminole Rock/Auer at 39%.311 One in ten rule
drafters (11%), however, also indicated that none of these deference doctrines
played a role in their drafting decisions. One rule drafter's comment may sum-
marize the sentiments of this minority view:
Honestly . . . not so much. I generally try to make a rule conform with a statute
as much as possible. If the statute has gaps, I rely on my agency's technical
expertise for the best, most reasonable way to fill them. That may be what
these doctrines ultimately stand for, but I think of it in terms of what is practi-
cable and honest, not what the court cases specifically say,312
With nine in ten rule drafters (90%) indicating that Chevron plays a role in their
drafting decisions, Chevron was reported as used by the most rule drafters sur-
veyed of all the interpretive tools inquired about in this survey.3 Again, Chev-
ron (at 58%) was also the big winner in the use-by-name game among congres-
sional respondents. 314
Unlike in the congressional context, these findings with respect to the rule
drafters' use of the various administrative law deference doctrines have impli-
cations beyond how federal agencies understand their relationship with Con-
gress and the scope of congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to fed-
307. Q17(a)-(d) (n= 109).
308. Q17, cmt. 2; see also id. cmt. I ("I don't know these cases intimately by name. I
may be familiar with the principles they stand for, but I would have to look them up. I have
checked only the ones I know by name.").
309. Gluck & Brcssman, Part I, supra note 19, at 927 fig.1, 994.
310, See id. at 927 fig.1.
311. Q8(a)-(d) (n=109).
312. Q18, cmt. 5 (ellipsis in original).
313. See supra Figure 2 (mapping where all of these deference doctrines rank among
the interpretive tools agency rule drafters use when drafting).
314. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 19, at 928 fig.2.
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eral agencies. The findings also shed light on how agency interpretive practices
could differ depending on whether the agency believes Chevron or Skidmore
will apply. As explored elsewhere, the vast majority of agency rule drafters
surveyed think about judicial review when drafting statutes and understand
Chevron and Skidmore and how their chances in court are better under Chev-
ron. Indeed, two in five rule drafters surveyed agreed or strongly agreed-and
another two in five somewhat agreed-that a federal agency is more aggressive
in its interpretive efforts if it is confident that Chevron deference (as opposed to
Skidmore deference or de novo review) applies.3 15
In other words, when rule drafters indicate they "use" administrative law
doctrines when interpreting statutes, it could mean that they are more or less
aggressive in their interpretive efforts depending on which deference standard
applies. Understanding how agencies perceive and use the deference doctrines
in rule drafting can shed light on how Congress or courts can modify those doc-
trines to control and patrol congressional delegations of lawmaking authority to
its bureaucratic agents. These findings on how the rule drafters use the adminis-
trative law deference doctrines-and how, in turn, congressional or judicial
modification of the deference doctrines may shape agency statutory interpreta-
tion-are explored in much greater detail elsewhere.
3 16
2. Big winner by concept: Mead (and agency expertise)
As noted in Part IV.C.1, fewer rule drafters knew (61%) and used (49%)
Mead by name than Chevron or Skidmore. But when asked if they knew the
principles set forth in Mead-that is, that congressional authorization for, and
agency use of, rulemaking or formal adjudication are strong indicia of congres-
sional delegation of law-elaboration authority to agencies 3 their answers in-
dicate they understood the Mead doctrine in practice. In particular, the rule
drafters were asked whether eight different factors "affect whether Chevron
deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or no deference) applies to an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers." Table 1 pre-
sents their answers to this question.3
8
The leading factors the agency rule drafters reported to affect whether
Chevron deference applies are the two Mead principles: whether Congress au-
thorized the agency to engage in rulemaking and/or formal adjudication under
the statute (84%), and whether the agency promulgated the interpretation via
rulemaking and/or formal adjudication (80%), followed closely by whether the
agency has expertise relevant to interpreting the statutory provisions at issue
315. See Walker, supra note 19, at 721-25.
316. See id. at 709-11, 721-29.
317. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
318. Q19(a)-(h) (n=92). Because this question asks the rule drafters about which factors
affect which deference regime applies, the number of respondents considered and the per-




(79%). No other factor received an affirmative response from more than half
of the rule drafters surveyed. The longstanding nature of the agency's interpre-
tation garnered 43%, its contemporaneous nature 20%, and its furtherance of
the uniform administration of law 18%.320 Perhaps most remarkably, only one
in ten (9%) indicated that whether the agency is politically accountable for its
interpretation affects Chevron deference, 321 In the comments, one legal realist
suggested an additional factor: "A review of the cases suggest[s] that whether a
court is inclined to agree with the agency sometimes dictates whether it will
apply Chevron."3 22
With the rule drafters flagging the two Mead principles at 84% and 80%,
the Mead doctrine was one of the most reported as used among the interpretive
tools tested in this study. Only Chevron (at 90%), the whole act rule (at 89%),
and the ordinary meaning canon (at 87%) were reported as used by more of the
rule drafters surveyed.3 23 Bressman and Gluck also indicated that, when con-
gressional drafters were asked about the doctrines by concept,
Mead was a "big winner" in our study-the canon whose underlying assump-
tion was most validated by our [congressional] respondents after Chevron:
88% told us that the authorization of notice-and-comment rulemaking (the
signal identified by the Court in Mead) is always or often relevant to whether
drafters intend for an agency to have gap-filling authority.
In other words, while Justice Scalia and a number of scholars might be right
that Mead has "[m]uddled"325 the approach courts apply to determine if Chev-
319. Q19(a)-(b), (d) (n=92). That four in five rule drafters indicated that agency exper-
tise is a touchstone for Chevron deference may provide support for the argument advanced
by a number of scholars that "agency expertise . . . should be a necessary condition for Chev-
ron deference." Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV, 1, 41 (2015); see also
id. at 11-16 (reviewing literature and case law).
320. Ql9(e)-(g) (n=92).
321. Q19(h) (n=92).
322. Id. cmt. 1. The agency rule drafters were also asked if they agreed that formal ad-
judication is a useful tool for promulgating agency statutory interpretations and if courts de-
fcr to agency interpretations in formal adjudications to the same extent as rulemaking. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, a significant number either did not know or did not agree:
* Formal adjudication can serve as a useful tool for promulgating agency statutory in-
terpretations: 4% strongly agree, 22% agree, 34% somewhat agree, 30% disagree,
11% strongly disagree. Q16(d) (n=83). Of those who did not weigh in, 23 expressly
indicated they did not know.
* Courts defer to agency interpretations in formal adjudication to the same extent as
rulemaking: 3% strongly agree, 15% agree, 40% somewhat agree, 37% disagree,
5% strongly disagree. Q16(e) (n=60). Of those who did not weigh in, 47 expressly
indicated they did not know.
These findings may just reflect that the respondents are rule drafters, but they may also re-
flect the scarce attention given-at least in the literature-to Chevron deference in the adju-
dication context.
323. Q9(a) (n= 1l9); Q14(a) (n= 114); Q18(a) (n=109); see supra Figure 2 (providing
the full list).
324. Gluck & Bressman, Part 1, supra note 19, at 999.
325. Bressman, supra note 42, at 1443.
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ron applies to a particular agency statutory interpretation,32 6 it seems agency
rule drafters and congressional drafters-at least those surveyed in these two
studies-are fairly adept at recognizing the Mead touchstones for congressional
delegation.
TABLE 1
Which Factors Affect Whether Chevron Deference Applies to Agency's
Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes It Administers?
Congress Authorized Agency Rulemaking or Formal Adjudication 84%
Agency Interpretation Made by Rulemaking or Formal Adjudication 80%
Agency Expertise Relevant to Statutory Provision 79%
Agency Interpretation Sets Forth Bounds of Agency's Jurisdiction 46%
Agency Interpretation Is Longstanding 43%
Agency Interpretation Is Contemporaneous 20%
Agency Interpretation Furthers Uniform Administration of Law 18%
Agency Is Politically Accountable for Its Interpretation 9%
3. What about Seminole Rock/Auer?
It is a bit of a puzzle what impact Seminole Rock/Auer deference has on the
two in five agency rule drafters (39%) who said they think about it when draft-
ing regulations. One comment, however, may shed some light: "Re: Seminole
Rock/Auer, I personally would attempt to avoid issuing ambiguous regulations
that we would then have to interpret." In other words, the rule drafters who
326. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239-41, 245-46 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the confusion Mead causes for courts in deciding whether Chevron
applies); see also, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 480 (2002) (describing
Mead as "providfing] little guidance to lower courts, agencies, and regulated parties about
how to discern congressional intent in any given set of circumstances"); Thomas W. Merrill,
The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L.
REv, 807, 813 (2002) (explaining that Mead provides "an undefined standard that invites
consideration of a number of variables of indefinite weight"); Adrian Vermeule, Iniroduc-
tion: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 347, 361 (2003) (arguing that Mead's




indicated Auer deference plays a role in drafting decisions may be saying they
attempt to avoid drafting ambiguous regulations.
Or perhaps because Auer is so deferential to an agency's interpretation of
its own regulation, the rule drafters may be saying they do not have to worry
about being clear and precise, as they can always clarify and clean up in subse-
quent guidance. That two in five rule drafters confirmed that Auer deference
plays a role in drafting may also provide some support for Justice Scalia's call
to revisit the doctrine due to the odd incentives it may create for agency draft-
ing: "[Tihe power to prescribe is augmented by the power to interpret; and the
incentive is to speak vaguely and broadly, so as to retain a 'flexibility' that will
enable 'clarification' with retroactive effect."32 8
Unfortunately, there was not enough space in the survey to ask how the
rule drafters "use" Auer deference when drafting regulations and interpreting
statutes. It would be interesting to know how exactly agency rule drafters use
Auer to assess whether Justice Scalia's intuitions about perverse incentives are
empirically grounded. But the fact that two in five rule drafters surveyed indi-
cated that they are using Auer deference when drafting regulations may well
persuade many that it is not worth preserving, as such a doctrine should play no
role at the initial regulation-drafting stage. In all events, this is another area of
agency statutory interpretation that could benefit from deeper empirical inves-
tigation.
CONCLUSION
The findings reported in this Article shed unprecedented light inside the
black box that is agency statutory interpretation. It turns out that the rule draft-
ers surveyed knew the canons of interpretation and administrative law doctrines
as well as, if not better than, their congressional counterparts surveyed in the
Bressman and Gluck study. Moreover, the findings suggest that federal agen-
cies play a critical role in the legislative process such that the rule drafters have
the intimate understanding of legislative history that Strauss hypothesized near-
ly a quarter century ago. The study's findings also provide a new window into
how federal agencies view themselves as faithful agents of Congress, as well as
the role of courts in this relationship-at least from the viewpoint of the agency
rule drafters surveyed. In sum, the rule drafters surveyed perceived the princi-
pal-agent relationship with Congress, where federal agencies-not courts-are
the primary interpretive agents but courts play a meaningful oversight role,
such that rule drafters often think about subsequent judicial review when inter-
preting statutes.
328. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); see also Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the
APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 1, 11-12 (1996) (asserting
that Auer deference encourages agency rule drafters to be "vague in framing regulations,
with the plan of issuing 'interpretations' to create the intended new law without observance
of notice and comment procedures").
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In addition to contributing to the legal and political science literature on
statutory interpretation and the modem administrative state, these findings pro-
vide valuable guidance for the real-world actors who actually make the admin-
istrative state function--whether that be the congressional principal who wants
to ensure federal agencies faithfully exercise their delegated lawmaking author-
ity, the agency general counsel who strives to train her rule drafters to utilize
proper interpretive practices, or the judge who is tasked by Congress to review
an agency statutory interpretation or interpret a regulation.
Of all the empirical findings uncovered and theories confirmed or called
into question, however, the most important takeaway is that much more empiri-
cal and theoretical work needs to be done. If the democratic (and perhaps con-
stitutional) legitimacy of congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to
the regulatory state depends on faithful agency, then Congress, courts, and
scholars need to spend much more time understanding the empirical realities of
statutory interpretation inside the modern administrative state.
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
INSIDE AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
SURVEY APPENDIXt
INTRODUCTION
This study is the first to investigate empirically how federal agency rule
drafters approach statutory interpretation. You are being asked to participate in
this survey because you have been identified as an agency official who has ex-
perience in statutory interpretation and rulemaking.
Courts have developed a broad variety of judicial review doctrines in ad-
ministrative law as well as tools of statutory interpretation-many of which are
based on empirical assumptions about how Congress and agencies draft statutes
and regulations, respectively. Yet little work has been done to understand
whether these empirical assumptions are correct, much less the extent to which
the drafters actually work against this interpretive backdrop. As courts, Con-
gress, and scholars gain insight into how agencies understand and use interpre-
tive rules and judicial review doctrines, these rules and doctrines should evolve
to better reflect actual congressional and agency assumptions and lead to more
predictable administrative law.
Your participation is voluntary, and you can withdraw at any time during
the survey. The survey consists of 35 questions and should take between 15-25
minutes to complete. The survey asks what you, as an agency rule drafter, think
about the use of semantic and substantive canons of interpretation and legisla-
tive history as well as the effect that the Supreme Court's administrative law
doctrines may have on agency drafting. The survey results will be anonymous,
and you should not include any agency-specific or otherwise sensitive infor-
mation in the survey's optional open-ended comment boxes,
If you have any questions or comments about the survey, please do not hes-
itate to contact me (walker-research@osu.edu; 614-247-1898). For questions
about your rights as a participant in this study or to discuss other study-related
concerns with someone not part of the research team, you may contact Sandra
Meadows in the Office of Responsible Research Practices at 1-800-678-6251.
Sincerely,
Christopher J. Walker, Principal Investigator
Christopher J. Walker is an Assistant Professor of Law at The Ohio State University's
Moritz College of Law. Professor Walker previously worked on the Justice Depart-
t Author's Note: This survey was administered via an online instrument, so the for-
matting of the questions differs in this reproduced version in two ways. First, with respect to
the multipart questions, this version collapses them into one question whereas the online sur-
vey presented those multipart questions in matrices. Second, this version does not reflect
that-with the exception of the first two questions in the survey-all questions included an
open-ended prompt for additional comments.
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ment's Civil Appellate Staff-where he represented federal agencies and defended
regulations in a variety of contexts-and clerked on the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court. This research isjunded in part by the Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Poli-
cy Studies at The Ohio State University,
PART I BACKGROUND
Please answer the following eight questions about your background.
1. Our records show that you are currently working, or have worked within
the last two years, in a general counsel office, legal department, or other
rulemaking office in a federal agency AND that you have had experience




If you are at he FDA, please type "FDA" here:
2. Are/were you a political or career employee?
i, Political
ii. Career
iii. Both, but most recently political
iv. Both, but most recently career
3. How long have you worked at a federal agency in a capacity that includes
some rulemaking work?
i. Five years or more
ii. Fewer than five years
iii. Other (explain)
4. For how many rules have you had a role in the drafting process?
i. 0-2
ii. 3-6
iii. 7 or more
iv. Don't know




6. What year did you graduate from law school? If you are not an attorney,
please indicate your terminal degree in the Additional Comments box.
i. Drop-down menu
ii. I am currently in law school
iii. I did not attend law school (please indicate terminal degree)
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7. Did you take a course in law school that focused on legislation, statutory
interpretation, or statutory drafting in general?
i. Yes
ii. No
iii. N/A-I did not attend law school
iv. Other (explain)
8. Have you taken a course other than in law school that focused on legisla-
tion, statutory interpretation, or statutory drafting in general?
i. Yes (state where and when)
ii. No
iii. Other (explain)
PART II: THE SEMANTIC CANONS
Please answer the following six questions regarding your understanding and
use of various semantic canons of interpretation. Throughout the rest of the
survey, there will be optional, open-ended comment boxes at the end of each
question. Please include any additional comments that you feel appropriate, in-
cluding insights into whether we are asking the right questions. Remember not
to include any agency-specific or otherwise sensitive information in these
comment boxes.
9. Are you familiar with any of the following canons of construction that con-
cern how textual terms are to be construed? (mark all that apply)
a. Ordinary meaning canon
b. Noscitur a sociis
c. Ejusdem generis
d. The rule against superfluities or redundancy
e. Expressio unius/inclusio unius
f. In pari materia
g. Whole act rule
h. Whole code rule
i. None of the above
10. Which have you considered in interpreting statutes and/or drafting rules?
(mark all that apply)
a. Ordinary meaning canon
b. Noscitur a sociis
c. Ejusdem generis
d. The rule against superfluities or redundancy
e. Expressio unius/inclusio unius
f. In pari materia
g. Whole act rule
h. Whole code rule
i. None of the above
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11. Do you believe that courts rely on any of these rules in interpreting legisla-
tion and/or regulations? (mark all that apply)
a. Ordinary meaning canon
b. Noscitur a sociis
c. Ejusdem generis
d. The rule against superfluities or redundancy
e. Expressio unius/inclusio unius
f. In pari materia
g. Whole act rule
h. Whole code rule
i. None of the above
12. Does it matter to your rule-drafting practices whether courts routinely rely




13. The following statements concern statutory or regulatory "lists." By this,
we mean provisions such as: "No person shall commit animal cruelty,
where 'animal cruelty' is defined as 'conduct in which a living animal is
intentionally maimed, mutilated, kicked, punched, or harmed."'
Please rate the accuracy of the following assertions by indicating how often
you would expect the statement to be true:
a. The terms in such a list relate to one another.
b. Terms not on the list are intended to be excluded.
c. Each word in the list has an independent meaning and is not intend-
ed to overlap with other terms on the list.
d. Where a list includes specific classes of things and then refers to
them in general ("or any other" thing), the general statement only







14. Please rate the accuracy of the following assertions by indicating how often
you would expect the statement to be true:
a. When a particular term is used in multiple places in the same statute
(or rule), that term is intended to mean the same thing throughout
the entire statute (or rule).
b. When a particular term is used in multiple places in the same sec-
tion of a statute (or rule), that term is intended to mean the same
thing within a single section.
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c. When a particular term is used in a statute (or rule), that term is in-
tended to mean the same thing as the same term means in other stat-
utes (or rules) in related subject areas.
d. When a particular term is used in a statute, that term is intended to
mean the same thing in other statutes on unrelated subjects through-
out the U.S. Code.
e. Dictionaries are used by drafters in determining what terms to use in
statutes (or rules).
f. Dictionaries should be used by interpreters in determining the







PART III: AMBIGUITIES IN STATUTES AGENCIES ADMINISTER
Please answer the following nine questions regarding your views on interpret-
ing ambiguities in statutes agencies administer.
15. What kinds of statutory ambiguities or gaps do you believe congressional
drafters intend for the agency to fill? (mark all that apply)
a. Ambiguities/gaps relating to the details of implementation
b. Ambiguities/gaps relating to major policy questions
c. Ambiguities/gaps implicating questions of major economic signifi-
cance
d. Ambiguities/gaps implicating questions of major political signifi-
cance
e. Ambiguities/gaps implicating serious constitutional questions
f. Ambiguities/gaps relating to the agency's own jurisdiction or regu-
latory authority
g. Ambiguities/gaps relating to the preemption of state law
h. Ambiguities/gaps relating to the division of labor between state and
federal agencies when both are given implementation roles
i. Ambiguities/gaps relating to omissions in the statute
j. Ambiguities/gaps relating to the agency's area of expertise
k. None of the above
1. I don't know
m.Other (explain)
16. Please evaluate the following statements:
a. The principles related to how much deference courts will accord
federal agency decisions allow congressional drafters to leave statu-
tory terms ambiguous because the agency can later specify those
terms.
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b. If a statute is ambiguous and the agency's construction is reasona-
ble, a court must accept the agency's construction of the statute,
even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is
the best statutory interpretation.
c. A court's opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an
agency is charged with administering is not authoritative; instead,
the agency may choose a different construction so long as it is rea-
sonable.
d. Formal adjudication can serve as a useful tool for promulgating
agency statutory interpretations.
e. Courts defer to agency interpretations in formal adjudication to the






vi. I don't know
vii. Other (explain)
17. Are you familiar with any of the following interpretive doctrines related to
how much deference courts will accord federal agency decisions when







f. None of the above







f. None of the above
19, Which of the following do you believe affect whether Chevron deference
(as opposed to Skidmore deference or no deference) applies to an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers (mark all that apply):
a. Whether Congress authorized the agency to engage in rulemaking
andlor formal adjudication under the statute
b. Whether the agency promulgated the statutory interpretation via
rulemaking and/or formal adjudication
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c. Whether the agency's statutory interpretation sets forth the bounds
of the agency's jurisdiction or regulatory authority
d. Whether the agency has expertise relevant to interpreting the statu-
tory provisions at issue
e. Whether the agency's statutory interpretation is longstanding
f. Whether the agency's statutory interpretation is contemporaneous
g. Whether the agency's statutory interpretation furthers the uniform
administration of federal law
h. Whether the agency is politically accountable for its statutory inter-
pretation
i. None of the above
j. I don't know
20. Please evaluate the following statements:
a. When drafting rules and interpreting statutes, agency drafters such
as yourself think about subsequent judicial review.
b. The level of deference (Chevron, Skidmore, no deference, etc.) that
courts will apply to a particular agency statutory interpretation is
reasonably predictable.
c. Agency expectations about which level of deference (Chevron,
Skidmore, no deference, etc.) courts will apply to its statutory inter-
pretation affect the agency's drafting process.
d. If Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or no def-
erence) applies to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous stat-
ute it administers, the agency is more likely to prevail in court.
e. If the agency knows or strongly believes that Chevron deference (as
opposed to Skidmore deference or no deference) will apply to a par-
ticular agency interpretation, the agency will be more willing to ad-
vance a more aggressive interpretation of the statute.
f. If Skidmore deference (as opposed to no deference) applies to an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers, the
agency is more likely to prevail in court.
g. If the agency knows or strongly believes that Chevron deference
will not apply, the agency will be less willing to advance a more ag-






vi. I don't know
vii. Other (explain)
For this question, the following definitions apply:
* Chevron Step Zero: whether Congress delegated interpretive authority
to the agency
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* Chevron Step One: whether the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue
* Chevron Step Two: whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable or
permissible under the statute
21. At which step of Chevron do you think courts should resort to the follow-
ing tools of construction when reviewing an agency's interpretation of the
law? (mark all that apply)
a. Ordinary meaning canon
b. Noscitur a sociis
c. Ejusdem generis
d. The rule against superfluities or redundancy
e. Expressio unius/inclusio unius
f, In pari materia
g. Whole act rule
h. Whole code rule
i. Statutory structure
j. Statutory purpose/mischief evidence
k. Legislative history
i. N/A-do not know interpretive tool
ii. Not sure
iii. Never
iv. Chevron Step Zero
v. Chevron Step One
vi. Chevron Step Two
22. Are you familiar with any of the following principles in administrative
law? (mark any that apply)
a. Brand X (that a prior judicial interpretation does not always trump
an agency's subsequent and different interpretation of an ambiguous
statute)
b. Ventura ordinary remand rule (when a court finds an agency's deci-
sion to be erroneous, absent exceptional circumstances, the matter
should be remanded to the agency for further proceedings)
c. Governmental Inter-Circuit Nonacquiescence (that a ruling by one
circuit does not force the agency to abandon its interpretation in an-
other circuit)
d. None of the above
23. Do any of these doctrines play a role in rule drafting decisions (mark any
that apply)?
a. Brand X
b. Ventura ordinary remand rule
c. Governmental Inter-Circuit Nonacquiescence
d. None of the above
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PART IV: THE SUBSTANTIVE CANONS
Please answer the following five questions regarding your understanding and
use of various semantic canons of interpretation.
24. Are you familiar with any of the following substantive canons of construc-
tion that concern how textual terms are to be construed? (mark all that ap-
ply)
a. Rule of Lenity
b. Constitutional Avoidance
c. Presumption Against Preemption
d. Presumption Against Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
e. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
f. Presumption Against Implied Right of Action
g. None of the above
25. Which have you considered in interpreting statutes and/or drafting rules?
(mark all that apply)
a. Rule of Lenity
b. Constitutional Avoidance
c. Presumption Against Preemption
d. Presumption Against Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
e. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
f. Presumption Against Implied Right of Action
g. None of the above
26. Do you believe that courts rely on any of these rules in interpreting legisla-
tion? (mark all that apply)
a. Rule of Lenity
b. Constitutional Avoidance
c. Presumption Against Preemption
d. Presumption Against Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
e. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
f. Presumption Against Implied Right of Action
g. None of the above
27. Does it matter to your rule drafting practices whether courts routinely rely




For this question, the following definitions apply:
* Chevron Step Zero: whether Congress delegated interpretive authority
to the agency
* Chevron Step One: whether the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue
1076 [Vol. 67:999
May 20151 INSIDE AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1077
Chevron Step Two: whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable or
permissible under the statute
28. At which step of Chevron do you think courts should resort to the follow-
ing substantive canons when reviewing an agency's interpretation of the
law? (mark all that apply)
a. Rule of Lenity
b. Constitutional Avoidance
c. Presumption Against Preemption
d. Presumption Against Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
e. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
f. Presumption Against Implied Right of Action
i. N/A-do not know canon
ii. Not sure
iii. Never
iv. Chevron Step Zero
v. Chevron Step One
vi, Chevron Step Two
PART V: LEGISLATIVE AND DRAFTING PROCESS
This is the final part of the survey. Please answer the following seven questions
regarding your understanding of the legislative and drafting process.
29. Please evaluate the following statements about you and your agency's role
in the legislative process:
a. The agency participates in a technical drafting role of the statutes it
administers.
b. I participate on behalf of the agency in a technical drafting role of
the statutes the agency administers.
c. The agency participates in a policy or substantive drafting role of
the statutes it administers.
d. I participate on behalf of the agency in a policy or substantive draft-
ing role of the statutes the agency administers.
e. The agency participates in drafting legislative history (e.g., floor
statements, committee reports, conference reports, hearing testimo-
ny and questions, etc.) of statutes it administers.
f. I participate on behalf of the agency in drafting legislative history
(e.g., floor statements, committee reports, conference reports, hear-







vi. N/A-I don't know
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vii. Other (explain)
30. What is the purpose of legislative history? (mark all that apply)
a. To explain the purpose(s) of the statute
b. To explain the meaning of particular terms in the statute
c. To indicate a disagreement over the meaning of a particular term or
provision
d. To indicate a decision to leave a deliberate ambiguity in the statute
e. To facilitate the political "deals" that resulted in enacting the statute
f. To shape the way that agencies will interpret deliberate ambiguities
g. To shape the way that individuals or courts will interpret deliberate
ambiguities
h. To shape the way that the statute will apply to unforeseen future de-
velopments
i. To shape the way that individuals or courts will interpret contested
terms
j I don't know
k. Other (explain)





32. For each of the following, please tell us if the type of legislative history is a
(VR) very reliable source, a (SR) somewhat reliable source, or not a (NR)
reliable source for agencies (and courts) to use in resolving questions about
statutory ambiguities or statutory implementation. Or indicate that you do
not know.
a. Floor statements by Members in support of the statute
b. Floor statements by Members opposed to the statute
c. Floor statements by party leadership
d. Floor statements by sponsor(s) of the statute
e. Committee reports in support of the statute
f. Committee reports in opposition to the statute
g. Conference reports
h. Hearing transcripts
i. Presidential signing statements
33. In deciding whether a piece of legislative history is sufficiently reliable to
guide your interpretation of a statute, do any of the following matter to
your assessment? (mark all that apply)
a. How many Members have heard/read the relevant statement/report
b. Whether the statement/report was drafted or made by a Member
c. How close the statement/report was made prior to the day the legis-
lation passed
1078 [Vol. 67:999
May 2015] INSIDE AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
d. Whether the statement was made after the legislation passed
e. Whether the statement/report favors or opposes the legislation
f. Whether the statement/report was essential to the political deal that
resulted in enacting the statute
g. I don't know
h. Other (explain)
34. Please evaluate the following statements:
a. Agencies should draft the statements of basis and purpose accom-
panying their rules in part to guide courts in interpreting those rules
b. Agencies actually do draft the statements of basis and purpose ac-
companying their rules in part to guide courts in interpreting those
rules
c. Courts should use statements of basis and purpose when interpreting
those rules







vi. I don't know
vii. Other (explain)
35. Thinking about your own experiences with statutory interpretation, how






v. N/A-I don't know
vi. Other (explain below)
CONCLUSION
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey on agency drafting. If
you would like to receive updates on the study's findings or would be willing to
participate in a follow-up interview (subject to permission from your agency),
please email me at walker-research@osu.edu. If you have any questions or ad-
ditional comments, please do not hesitate to contact me by email or phone
(614-247-1898).
Sincerely,
Christopher J. Walker
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